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Abstract 
My dissertation examines in three essays how firms utilize exploitation and exploration 
strategies, independently and in combination, for competitive advantage. The first essay 
examines whether firms can gain competitive advantage by the simultaneous pursuit of 
exploitation and exploration (i.e., an ambidextrous strategy). Utilizing a cross-industry survey of 
marketing executives, I demonstrate that ambidextrous firms outpace non-ambidextrous ones 
across several performance dimensions. Importantly, implementation of an ambidextrous 
strategy at the marketing function level mediates the relationship between a firm’s ambidextrous 
strategy and its performance. Finally, differences in the mediating relationship between 
manufacturing and services firms are found.  
Essay two conceptualizes exploitation and exploration as capabilities. Drawing on 
longitudinal objective data from publicly-traded pharmaceutical companies, this study examines 
how firms maintain exploitation and exploration capabilities over time. Stochastic frontier 
estimation is used to create capability measures for exploitation and exploration for each firm in 
each period. The capabilities are then linked to historical and forward-looking performance, as 
measured by Return on Assets and Tobin’s q respectively. The results show that firms with 
stronger exploration capabilities have higher Tobin’s q values. Stronger exploitation capabilities, 
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however, negatively affect Tobin’s q. In contrast, exploitation has a positive effect on historical 
performance while exploration has no effect. Surprisingly, firms that have stronger capabilities in 
both exploitation and exploration gain no significant performance advantage.  
Finally, given the difficulty of managing exploitation and exploration, the third essay 
investigates how firms can improve their focus on these strategies. Specifically, it examines 
customer divestment, or strategically terminating relationships. Research notes that most 
customers offer little or no value to a firm. This means that a firm’s investments in exploitation 
and exploration are potentially greatly misapplied. I use archival data to explore the prevalence 
of customer divestment across industries. I then investigate the customer divestment concept 
with managers and customers, yielding a broad framework of key relationships. Finally, an 
experiment is used to begin to empirically test key relationships. The results demonstrate that it 
is better for managers not to provide a warning prior to divestment as it creates more negative 
attitudes toward the firm. 
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1.0  SECTION I:  INTRODUCTION 
A global survey of four hundred twenty-five executives highlighted a continuing battle for firms 
– that of creating competitive advantage by simultaneously excelling in both exploiting existing 
markets and creating new ones (Accenture 2005). An exploitation strategy is focused on 
satisfying the current customer base (e.g., Benner and Tushman 2003; March 1991; Srivastava, 
Shervani, and Fahey 1999). Exploration, on the other hand, is focused on increasing the firm’s 
ability to adapt quickly and appropriately to major market changes through radical change, 
experimentation and risk (Katila and Ahuja 2002). Firms that effectively manage the inherent 
tension between exploration and exploitation by focusing on both simultaneously follow an 
“ambidextrous strategy” (Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004; Tushman and O’Reilly 1997).  
The literature on managing exploitation and exploration reveals considerable debate. 
Proponents suggest that balancing exploitation and exploration makes sense for many firms (e.g., 
Abell 1993; Williamson 1999), and may even be necessary for survival (e.g., Christensen 1998; 
Lewin and Volberda 1999). Tushman and O’Reilly (1997) contend that “organizations can 
sustain their competitive advantage by operating in multiple modes simultaneously – managing 
for short-term efficiency by emphasizing stability and control, as well as for long-term 
innovation by taking risks.” (1997: 167) Exploitation and exploration are two complementary or 
orthogonal dimensions rather than two conflicting ends of a continuum (Gibson and Birkinshaw 
2004; Gupta, Smith, and Shalley 2006; Katila and Ahuja 2002; Lewin and Volberda 1999).  An 
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over-emphasis on exploitation can stifle a firm’s ability to alter its course in a changing market 
(Cyert and March 1992). Conversely, a strategy that over-emphasizes exploration can lead firms 
to innovate without exploiting their advances for profit (Levinthal and March 1993). When used 
effectively, an ambidextrous approach limits both organizational inertia and management myopia 
(Levinthal and March 1993).  
Detractors posit that attempting to balance exploration and exploitation strategies raises 
the risk of a firm being good at neither (e.g., Kotler 1997; Miles, Snow, Meyer, and Coleman 
1978; Miller and Friesen 1986). The constant pressure from stock analysts and shareholders to 
“make earnings” may prime managers to exploit rather than explore (Benner and Tushman 
2002). Pursuing both strategies may result in punishment in the form of lower stock prices, 
market value or credit ratings. Intense competitive actions can also preclude firms from making 
the necessary actions to support both strategies. Furthermore, firm-wide shocks or organization 
culture issues can disrupt the flow of resources in support of both strategies, redirecting them to 
one or other or neither. These differing emphases can create an untenable pressure on managers 
that may force many firms down a more focused exploitation or exploration path as opposed to 
balancing both strategies.  
The considerable debate and the many unexplored areas of study make these concepts 
fertile ground for continued research. In my dissertation, I take the perspective of exploitation 
and exploration as orthogonal variables that can co-exist and seek to make four contributions that 
examine how (and if) firms can achieve a balance between the two approaches. First, most prior 
research places a strong emphasis on factors that influence exploitation and/or exploration, often 
taking learning, team dynamics or organizational effectiveness perspectives in an examination of 
key relationships (e.g., Beckman 2006; Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004; March 1991; Miller, Zhao, 
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and Calantone 2006). Furthermore, the unit of analysis is often the individual or the team (e.g., 
project or leadership team) within the firm. By doing so, it has resulted in a general lack of 
understanding about functional-level issues (e.g., marketing) such as how exploitation and 
exploration are implemented in practice. In the first essay, I specifically examine the role of 
marketing function implementation in translating exploitation and exploration strategies into 
successful performance.  
Second, empirical evidence demonstrating the impact of exploitation and exploration on 
firm performance, particularly financial, is still very limited (for exceptions, see Gibson and 
Birkinshaw 2004; He and Wong 2004; Kyriakopoulos and Moorman 2004). Prior research 
suggests that a finer-grained view of firm performance is needed to provide a clearer picture of 
exactly how the firm’s success is affected by its strategy (Chakravarthy 1986; Clark 1999; 
Walker and Ruekert 1987). I expand on the financial impact of exploitation and exploration on 
the firm in the first two essays by examining historical and forward-looking measures of 
performance.  
Third, little is known about the time dependent effects of managing both exploitation and 
exploration (Gupta, Smith, and Shalley 2006). This key question is addressed in the second essay 
through a firm-wide lens by an examination of both how capabilities change over time and their 
subsequent impact on performance. Capabilities are those complex bundles of resources that 
manifest themselves through firm-wide processes and help create competitive advantage (Amit 
and Schoemaker 1993; Day 1994; Dutta, Narasimhan, and Rajiv 1999). Capabilities are accrued 
slowly (Barney 1991) and reconfigured over time to meet market needs (Eisenhardt and Martin 
2000; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997). Viewing exploitation and exploration as capabilities 
enables the analysis of the key inputs and outputs that result in competitive advantage over time.  
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Finally, given the difficulty of managing exploitation and exploration, the importance of 
keeping the firm on track becomes paramount. The third essay investigates how firms can 
improve their focus on exploitation and exploration. Specifically, it examines the little-
researched phenomenon of customer divestment, or strategically terminating relationships with 
customers. Research notes that most customers offer little or no value to a firm (Rust, Lemon, 
and Zeithaml 2004). This means that a firm’s investments in exploitation and exploration are 
potentially greatly misapplied due to management myopia of customer value (Levitt and March 
1988) and inertia (Levinthal and March 1993). Divesting customers can free resources that are 
currently being applied toward investments that do not benefit the firm’s exploitation and 
exploration capabilities.   
1.1 SYNOPSIS OF ESSAY 1 
The first essay investigates whether firms can gain competitive advantage by balancing 
exploitation and exploration strategies (i.e., an ambidextrous strategy). This essay seeks to enrich 
the limited understanding of when ambidextrous strategies will be most effective by answering 
three questions: 1) What role does functional implementation play in translating a firm’s 
ambidextrous strategy into superior performance? 2) How does organizational ambidexterity 
affect different facets of a firm’s performance, such as profitability, customer satisfaction, and 
new product success? 3) Does the type of the firm (e.g., manufacturing, services) affect the 
impact of organizational ambidexterity on performance? 
  
 
5
Each of these three questions is focused on an issue that can potentially play a profound 
role in affecting the success of organizational ambidexterity. For example, functional 
implementation is the translation of a firm’s strategy into action by functional units within the 
firm (e.g., marketing). Bonoma (1984) suggests that successful implementation at the functional 
level is critical to ensuring the success of a firm’s strategy. Given the difficulty of balancing a 
high level of exploration with a high level of exploitation, I expect that functional 
implementation will play a particularly important role for firms attempting to implement an 
ambidextrous strategy. To test this impact, I examine the mediating effect of functional 
implementation of marketing on the firm’s ambidextrous strategy – performance relationship.  
Second, most research of ambidextrous organizations to date has emphasized revenue as 
the primary performance outcome (e.g., Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004; He and Wong 2004). 
Although there is no question that revenue is an important measure of firm performance, a focus 
on this single outcome alone provides an incomplete picture of the firm’s overall success. For 
example, revenues achieved at a very high cost (e.g., due to excessive expenditures on R&D) 
may be unprofitable. Thus, a finer-grained view of firm performance is needed (Chakravarthy 
1986; Clark 1999; Walker and Ruekert 1987) to provide a clearer picture of exactly how the 
firm’s success is affected by its strategy. In this paper, the effects of organizational ambidexterity 
on revenue are examined, as has been done in previous work, and expanded to include the 
examination of marketing-related outcomes such as profitability, customer satisfaction and new 
product introductions.  
Third, past work has focused on the effects of organizational ambidexterity in the 
manufacturing context. However, research in other domains has demonstrated inherent and 
important differences between manufacturing and service firms (Brouthers and Brouthers 2003; 
  
 
6
Erramilli and Rao 1993). No theory currently exists to suggest how these two types of businesses 
systematically differ from one another in terms of how they implement and/or benefit from 
organizational ambidexterity. Thus, a third goal of this paper is to investigate this issue 
empirically. I do so by examining the moderating effects of firm type on the mediating effect of 
functional implementation on the ambidexterity – performance relationship.  
Utilizing a cross-industry survey of senior marketing managers in publicly traded U.S. 
firms, it is shown that ambidextrous firms outpace non-ambidextrous across all performance 
dimensions. Subjective performance measures are augmented by objective financial data drawn 
from COMPUSTAT and the latter confirm the positive effects found in the survey results. 
Importantly, functional implementation mediates the relationship between a firm’s ambidextrous 
strategy and its performance. Finally, differences in the mediating relationship between 
manufacturing and services firms are found. 
1.2 SYNOPSIS OF ESSAY 2 
Whereas the first essay is a cross-sectional multiple industry examination of exploitation and 
exploration, the second essay takes a longitudinal single industry view of these relationships and 
how they impact performance. Two important issues in this research stream still suffer from a 
lack of empirical evidence. First, one of the most pressing needs is a better understanding of how 
exploitation and exploration change over time (Beckman 2006; Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006; 
Gupta, Smith, and Shalley 2006; Tushman and O’Reilly 1996). March (1991) argues that though 
exploitation and exploration often compete for firm resources, balancing these demands over 
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time, although difficult, is necessary for competitive advantage. This perspective suggests that 
investments in both exploitation and exploration must be made to create performance advantage. 
Firms who pursue a particular approach may, when evaluated at a single point in time or over 
just a few years, appear to be poor performers when compared to competitors (Hutt, Reingen, 
and Ronchetto 1988). Therefore, a dynamic examination provides a longer-term understanding 
of the contribution of exploitation and exploration to firm performance. Second, as mentioned in 
previous paragraphs, there is considerable debate as to whether or not performance advantages 
accrue to firms that effectively balance exploitation and exploration rather than focus on either 
strategy (see Christensen 1998; Gupta, Smith, and Shalley 2006; Levinthal and March 1993; 
Miller and Friesen 1986) A longitudinal evaluation of these relationships helps to clarify the 
potential “systematic” benefits of a balanced strategy versus a focused one. 
I draw on the resource-based view of the firm (Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993; Wernerfelt 
1984) as the theoretical foundation and examine exploitation and exploration as capabilities - the 
outputs generated from resource investments made by the firm (Grant 1996; Venkatraman, Lee, 
and Iyer 2006; Winter 2003). Using longitudinal objective data from publicly-traded 
pharmaceutical firms, I separately examine the development of exploitation and exploration 
capabilities as well as the spillover effects of prior year investments. Stochastic frontier 
estimation, an input-output econometric technique, is used to create capability measures for 
exploitation and exploration for each firm in each period. Next, the effects of current year 
investments on exploitation and exploration capabilities are investigated. I then link the 
development or lack thereof of these capabilities to both historical and forward-looking 
performance measures that reflect both historical (ROA) and forward-looking (Tobin’s q) 
perspectives. Finally, I provide insight into the debate over whether or not firms should 
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simultaneously pursue both exploitation and exploration (e.g., Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004) or 
concentrate on one over the other (e.g., Miller and Friesen 1986). 
The results of the study in the second essay show that firms that maintain stronger 
exploration capabilities than competitors have higher Tobin’s q values. Firms that maintain 
stronger exploitation capabilities, however, negatively affect forward-looking performance. In 
contrast, exploitation has a positive effect on historical performance while exploration has no 
effect. Surprisingly, firms that have stronger capabilities in both exploitation and exploration 
gain no significant advantage in either historical or forward-looking performance.  
1.3 SYNOPSIS OF ESSAY 3 
Given the difficulty of managing exploitation and exploration, the third essay investigates how 
firms can improve their focus in both. Specifically, it examines the little-researched phenomenon 
of customer divestment. Customer divestment is defined as the firm-initiated termination of 
service to an existing customer (Mittal, Sarkees, and Murshed 2006). Research notes that most 
customers offer little or no value to a firm (Rust, Lemon, and Zeithaml 2004). This means that a 
firm’s investments in exploitation and exploration are potentially greatly misapplied due to 
management myopia of customer value (Levitt and March 1988) and inertia (Levinthal and 
March 1993). Academic research on customer divestment is virtually non-existent despite calls 
from marketing scholars (e.g., Haenlein, Kaplan, and Schoder 2006; Lehmann 1999; Morgan and 
Hunt 1994).  
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Many companies still lack an integrated, formal divestment processes. A failure to 
properly understand divestment can engender negative outcomes such as unfavorable publicity 
(“Sisters Banned by Bargain Chain” 2003), customer retaliation (Gallagher and Kennedy 1997), 
and negative word of mouth (Gitomer 2003). Managers are also afraid of the negative reactions 
of divested customers and potential damage to the firm. From the customers’ perspective, many 
do not have a clear idea of how divestment might affect them. Marketing academics indicate that 
more work is needed specifically in these areas of customer divestment (Lehmann 1999; 
Haenlein, Kaplan and Schoder 2006).  
Overall, the third essay seeks to answer four questions: 1) Is divestment prevalent? 2) 
How do managers view divestment? 3) How do customers feel about divestment? and 4) Are 
there ways for firms to mitigate the potential negative impact of customer divestment? I use 
archival data to explore the prevalence of customer divestment. Next, I explore the divestment 
concept among both managers and customers. Drawing on the collective insights, a customer 
divestment framework is developed. The results are surprising in that the complexity of customer 
divestment stretches far beyond mere profitability measures, touching many areas of the 
company and key stakeholders as well as customers and other interest groups. Furthermore, the 
underlying issue of expectations management in company-customer relationships is clearly 
evident in the minds of customers who experienced divestment. Finally, I use an experiment to 
begin to test the key relationships. It explores the central question of how managers can alleviate 
the potential negative outcomes on the firm from divestment. Interestingly, the results 
demonstrate that it is better for managers not to provide a warning prior to divestment as it gives 
customers time to reflect on the action and increases negative attitudes toward the company. 
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Finally, an agenda for future research is proposed with an understanding that there are still many 
unanswered questions in this area of research that need to be explored. 
The next three chapters present the essays in my dissertation. Essay 1 is entitled 
“Ambidextrous Organizations and Performance: The Mediating Effect of Functional 
Implementation”.  Essay 2 is entitled “Dynamic Returns to Investments in Exploitation and 
Exploration: Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry”. Essay 3 is entitled “Customer 
Divestment: Issues, Actions, and Reactions”. Finally, I discuss the overall contributions of my 
dissertation to the literature as well as to managerial practice. 
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2.0  SECTION II: ESSAY I: AMBIDEXTROUS ORGANIZATIONS AND 
PERFORMANCE: THE MEDIATING EFFECT OF FUNCTIONAL 
IMPLEMENTATION  
Achieving competitive advantage involves maintaining a delicate balancing act between 
exploiting the benefits from current business operations and exploring new innovative 
opportunities (Christensen 1998). Exploitation is focused on achieving greater efficiencies in 
existing operations and extracting greater benefits from existing markets (March 1991). 
Exploration is focused on increasing the firm’s ability to adapt quickly and appropriately to 
major market changes through radical change, experimentation and risk (Katila and Ahuja 2002). 
Firms that effectively manage the inherent tension between exploration and exploitation by 
focusing on both simultaneously follow an “ambidextrous strategy” (Gibson and Birkinshaw 
2004; Tushman and O’Reilly 1997).  
Attempting to follow both exploration and exploitation strategies raises the risk of a firm 
being good at neither (e.g., Kotler 1997; Miles, Snow, Meyer, and Coleman 1978; Miller and 
Friesen 1986). Some suggest that the differing processes and capabilities required of exploration 
and exploitation overwhelm the firm (Benner and Tushman 2002; Katila and Ahuja 2002). The 
constant pressure from stock analysts and shareholders to “make earnings” may also prime 
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managers to exploit rather than explore (Benner and Tushman 2002). As a result, many firms are 
content to focus on either exploration or exploitation. 
However, single-focus strategies also have their drawbacks. An over-emphasis on 
exploitation can stifle a firm’s ability to alter its course in a changing market (Cyert and March 
1992). Conversely, a strategy that over-emphasizes exploration can lead firms to innovate 
without exploiting their advances for profit (Levinthal and March 1993). By overemphasizing 
exploration, these firms seek to change the existing market (Deshpandé, Farley, and Webster 
1993). For example, during the Internet boom of the late 1990s, many start-up firms raced to 
innovate but neither extracted profits nor created operational efficiencies essential to longer-term 
competitive advantage. Many of these firms are now out of business. 
Increasingly, researchers are suggesting that an ambidextrous approach makes sense for 
many firms (e.g., Abell 1993; Williamson 1999), and may even be necessary for survival (e.g., 
Christensen 1998; Lewin and Volberda 1999). Tushman and O’Reilly (1997) contend that 
“organizations can sustain their competitive advantage by operating in multiple modes 
simultaneously – managing for short-term efficiency by emphasizing stability and control, as 
well as for long-term innovation by taking risks.” (1997: 167) When used effectively, an 
ambidextrous approach limits both organizational inertia and management myopia (Levinthal 
and March 1993). It also promotes a positive self-reinforcing cycle of activities that benefits both 
exploration and exploitation (Kyriakopoulos and Moorman 2004; Moorman and Slotegraaf 
1999). Under this view, exploitation and exploration represent two complementary – rather than 
conflicting – dimensions (Colbert 2004; Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004; Gupta, Smith, and Shalley 
2006; Lewin and Volberda 1999; Moorman and Slotegraaf 1999).  
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A recent special issue of the Academy of Management Journal (August, 2006) 
highlighted the growing importance, and complexity, of managing exploitation and exploration. 
Despite the many important insights gained from this research, the studies in this special issue 
largely focused on how knowledge and learning is used to create or disrupt the balance between 
the two approaches (e.g., Beckman 2006; Miller, Zhao, and Calantone 2006). Empirical evidence 
demonstrating the impact of organizational ambidexterity on firm performance, particularly 
financial, is still very limited (for exceptions, see Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004; He and Wong 
2004; Kyriakopoulos and Moorman 2004). Furthermore, little is still known about the challenges 
facing firms that want to achieve success through an ambidextrous strategy (Gupta, Smith, and 
Shalley 2006). This paper seeks to enrich our existing but limited understanding of when 
ambidextrous strategies will be most effective by answering the following three questions: 
• What role does functional implementation play in translating a firm’s 
ambidextrous strategy into superior performance? 
 
• How does organizational ambidexterity affect different facets of a firm’s 
performance, such as profitability, customer satisfaction, and new product 
success? 
 
• Does the nature of the firm’s business affect the impact of organizational 
ambidexterity on performance?  
 
Each of these three questions is focused on an issue that can potentially play a profound 
role in affecting the success of organizational ambidexterity. For example, functional 
implementation is the translation of a firm’s strategy into action by functional units within the 
firm (e.g., marketing). Bonoma (1984) suggests that successful implementation at the functional 
level is critical to ensuring the success of a firm’s strategy. Given the difficulty of balancing a 
high level of exploration with a high level of exploitation, it is expected that functional 
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implementation will play a particularly important role for firms attempting to implement an 
ambidextrous strategy. To test this impact, I examine the mediating effect of functional 
implementation on the firm’s ambidextrous strategy – performance relationship.  
Second, most research of ambidextrous organizations to date has emphasized revenue as 
the primary performance outcome (e.g., Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004; He and Wong 2004). 
Although there is no question that revenue is an important measure of firm performance, a focus 
on this single outcome alone provides an incomplete picture of the firm’s overall success. For 
example, revenues achieved at a very high cost (e.g., due to excessive expenditures on R&D) 
may be unprofitable. Thus, a finer-grained view of firm performance is needed (Chakravarthy 
1986; Clark 1999; Walker and Ruekert 1987) to provide a clearer picture of exactly how the 
firm’s success is affected by its strategy. In this paper, I examine the effects of organizational 
ambidexterity on revenue, as has been done in previous work, and expand our knowledge of 
these relationships by also evaluating profitability, customer satisfaction and new product 
introductions.  
Third, past work has focused on the effects of organizational ambidexterity in the 
manufacturing context. However, research in other domains has demonstrated inherent and 
important differences between manufacturing and service firms (Brouthers and Brouthers 2003; 
Erramilli and Rao 1993). No theory currently exists to suggest how these two types of businesses 
systematically differ from one another in terms of how they implement and/or benefit from 
organizational ambidexterity.  Thus, a third goal of this paper is to investigate this issue 
empirically. I do so by examining the moderating effects of firm type on the mediating effect of 
functional implementation on the ambidexterity – performance relationship. These three distinct 
sets of effects are summarized in Figure 1. 
  
 
 
Ambidextrous 
Firm Strategy 
Functional 
Implementation 
Firm Performance: 
•Revenue 
•Profit 
•Customer Satisfaction 
•New Product Introductions
H2+ 
Control Variables: 
 - Firm Size 
 - Firm Age 
Firm Type: Manufacturing versus Services 
H2+ 
H1+ 
 
 
Figure 1: Essay 1, Conceptual Framework 
 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, I discuss how distinct 
dimensions of performance are affected by an ambidextrous firm strategy, and argue that the 
implementation of an ambidextrous strategy at the functional level mediates the effects of 
organizational ambidexterity on these performance dimensions. I then conduct empirical tests of 
the proposed relationships using data from a survey of senior marketing managers in publicly 
traded U.S. firms. These subjective performance measures are augmented by objective financial 
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data drawn from COMPUSTAT. Next, I discuss the results and their implications. Finally, both 
the limitations of the study and suggestions for future research are discussed. 
2.1 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1.1 Organizational Ambidexterity 
A firm’s strategy represents how it chooses to compete in its markets (Varadarajan and Clark 
1994). A firm that employs an ambidextrous strategy maintains a high degree of balance between 
exploitation – characterized by a focus on efficiency and refinement – and exploration –
characterized by innovation, change and risk (Tushman and O’Reilly 1996).1 The firm draws on 
the complementary aspects of exploitation and exploration rather than viewing them as 
conflicting ends of a continuum (Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004; Katila and Ahuja 2002; 
Moorman and Slotegraaf 1999). Through the use of an ambidextrous strategy, managers hope to 
avoid an overemphasis on either exploitation or exploration to the exclusion of the other. For 
example, an over-emphasis on exploitation can stifle a firm’s ability to alter its course in a 
changing market (Cyert and March 1992). Core capabilities that contribute to success in 
exploitation can quickly turn into core rigidities (Leonard-Barton 1992), and initially favorable 
strategic choices can become inferior processes in the longer run (Heriott, Levinthal, and March 
1985). At the same time, a heavy emphasis on exploration can lead firms to take too many risks 
 
1 Consistent with Gupta, Smith, and Shalley (2006) and March (1991), all organizational activities embed some 
degree of learning, and that it is more useful to focus on the extent and type of learning that takes place rather than 
the presence or absence of learning.  
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and innovate without extracting profits (Levinthal and March 1993). Some of this over-emphasis 
in strategic direction results from the firm’s past successes in using a particular approach. As 
firms successfully improve their capabilities and efficiencies in – for example – exploitation, the 
desire to change focus diminishes (Levitt and March 1988). 
Simultaneously developing both strategic emphases can add to overall firm value, as the 
returns (e.g., economic, information, knowledge) from one emphasis can provide resources for 
use in the other at any specific point in time. Thus, exploitation and exploration become 
complementary activities, each reinforcing the other (Colbert 2004; Gibson and Birkinshaw 
2004; Gupta, Smith, and Shalley 2006). For example, revenue generated by exploiting current 
products and services can be allocated to exploring new product development opportunities. New 
products and services then generate the revenue that sustains investments in day-to-day 
operations. Therefore, firms that pursue a high degree of both exploration and exploration should 
ultimately realize greater benefits than competitors who overemphasize a single strategy.2 
2.1.2 Ambidextrous Business Strategy and Firm Performance 
The empirical work to date examining the link between an ambidextrous firm strategy and 
business performance has consistently found a strong positive relationship (e.g., Gibson and 
Birkinshaw 2004; He and Wong 2004; Venkatraman, Lee, and Iyer 2006). For example, Gibson 
and Birkinshaw (2004) studied a small number of firms in detail at the business unit level, using 
 
2 My view in this paper is consistent with that of Katila and Ahuja (2002), which argues that the interaction between 
exploration and exploitation can positively affect performance. The two emphases are seen as complements to one 
another, and though of as orthogonal variables rather than two ends of a continuum. (For similar arguments, see 
Baum, Li, and Usher 2000; Koza and Lewin 1998; Nerkar 2003.) 
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subjective measures of organizational effectiveness as a proxy for performance, and found that 
an ambidextrous strategy enhances performance. Similarly, in a study of innovative processes in 
Asian manufacturing firms, He and Wong (2004) found that firms that successfully pursue both 
incremental and radical innovations enjoy greater revenue growth rates than other firms. 
Interestingly, their study also showed that an overemphasis on either exploration or exploitation 
alone negatively affects revenue growth. Finally, Venkatraman et al. (2006) noted a direct and 
positive effect of ambidexterity on year-over-year revenue growth in software firms. 
2.1.2.1 Ambidexterity and Revenue 
An ambidextrous strategy positions the firm to enhance its revenue. The focus on 
refinement and efficiency gained from exploitation helps the firm to deliver its products and 
services in a manner that satisfies its current customer base. This increases the potential for 
repeat purchases as well as positive word-of-mouth, which can generate additional revenue for 
the firm (Oliver 1997; Reichheld 1996). Simultaneously, if resources are allocated to innovative 
activities that help the firm to capture the next wave of customers, future revenue opportunities 
also exist. This dual focus on current and future customers helps the firm to continuously find 
new ways to meet those customers’ needs (Kyriakopoulos and Moorman 2004). Firms that 
overemphasize exploitation may increase revenue from the existing customer base, but miss new 
revenue opportunities in emerging segments. The opposite can be said for exploration-focused 
firms that capture some revenues as early market movers, but that cannot exploit the benefits of 
their discoveries as well as fast follower competitors that enter the market with better scale 
capabilities. 
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Although increased revenue generation provides some comfort that an ambidextrous 
strategy is working, it is a potential success trap for managers. A sole focus on revenues may be 
misleading in that it neither reflects the overall profitability of the firm nor the firm’s on-going 
business health (e.g., as reflected by customer satisfaction or new product introductions). For 
example, an over-emphasis on sales revenue goals might work to the detriment of scale 
efficiencies, negatively affecting profits needed for investments to maintain the firm’s 
ambidexterity. Thus, revenues alone do not necessarily reflect a firm’s emphasis on 
ambidexterity, and it is important to examine additional performance measures that capture this 
longer-term orientation of the firm. 
2.1.2.2 Ambidexterity and Profits  
An ambidextrous strategy can also positively impact profits. Exploitation improves the 
firm’s current routines (March 1991) and capabilities (Leonard-Barton 1992), enabling the 
delivery of products and services at lower costs (making them more profitable even in the short 
term), and the release of resources for the firm’s use elsewhere. These resources can then be used 
for investments in innovation, in experimentation with new methodologies, or in risky endeavors 
such as alliances or acquisitions (i.e., exploration), helping to renew the firm’s knowledge and 
ward off inertia. Different from exploitation-focused firms, ambidextrous firms proactively use 
extra resources to explore opportunities that not only generate additional revenues but also allow 
for scale efficiencies. Although some negative impact on the firm may arise in the short term 
from using resources gained from exploitation for exploration (Hutt, Reingen, and Ronchetto 
1988), as the ambidextrous firm moves consistently down the learning curve, profitability will 
increase as exploitation and exploration become a self-reinforcing cycle. Firms that are highly 
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focused on exploitation may be more profitable in the short-term, but their failure to explore 
hurts them in the long-run.  
2.1.2.3 Ambidexterity and Customer Satisfaction 
Customer satisfaction is a measure of a customer’s relationship with the firm (Gruca and 
Rego 2005). At the heart of many firm strategies is the desire to develop and to maintain close 
relationships with customers (e.g., Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2000). Typically, firms hope for 
long-term relationships that are beneficial for both parties (Garbarino and Johnson 1999). An 
effective ambidextrous strategy, with a high degree of both exploitation and exploration, should 
meet the wants and needs of customers in the short- and long-term, thus increasing overall 
customer satisfaction. For example, extensive customer service capabilities allow firms to be 
close to the customer and to sense potential shifts in preferences. Different from exploitation- or 
exploration-focused firms, the ambidextrous firm has the resources and the knowledge to 
effectively translate what they learn from customers into value for both parties in the 
relationship. An imbalanced firm misses potential opportunities to increase customer satisfaction 
because it either lacks the resources (exploration-focused) or the knowledge (exploitation-
focused) to take advantage of shifting customer preferences and competitor challenges.  
2.1.2.4 Ambidexterity and New Product Introductions 
Although new product introductions are commonly perceived as an outcome of 
exploration, many new products involve extensions and upgrades of current products (Griffin 
1997). Therefore, the effects of both exploration and exploitation are seen in new product 
introductions (Kiriakopoulos and Moorman 2004). New products borne from innovation and 
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renewal are important to firm performance and long-term survival (Damanpour 1991). New 
products allow firms to change, adapt and renew themselves in the face of changing 
environmental conditions (Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt, and Lyman 1990). Firms that innovate well 
can win market share from competitors that are content to focus on attaining greater efficiencies 
from existing operations (Shankar, Carpenter, and Krishnamurthi 1998). Conversely, dominant 
firms can maintain their market positions through ongoing investments in innovation (Sorescu, 
Chandy, and Prabhu 2003). Firms must manage their ideas through the research and 
development phase into commercial production, channel distribution, and ultimate sale to reap 
benefits. The ambidextrous approach encourages managers and employees to challenge outdated 
practices, and rewards those who take calculated risks (Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004). This 
environment is conducive to knowledge creation and innovation that drives not only new 
products but also value-added improvements on existing products. Furthermore, the 
ambidextrous firm has the resources to invest in new product development as well as efficient 
mindset to these move innovations to market. Thus, firms that use an ambidextrous strategy will 
introduce more new products on a regular basis that those firms that over-emphasize exploitation 
or exploration (Katila and Ahuja 2002). 
It is my position, then, that an examination of various performance outcomes such as 
profit, customer satisfaction, and the number of new product introductions – as well as sales 
revenues – can help firms attain a more complete picture of how organizational ambidexterity 
affects their overall success. Summarizing: 
Hypothesis 1a. There is a significant, positive relationship between 
the extent to which the firm utilizes an ambidextrous firm strategy and its 
revenue.  
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Hypothesis 1b. There is a significant, positive relationship between 
the extent to which the firm utilizes an ambidextrous firm strategy and its 
profitability. 
Hypothesis 1c. There is a significant, positive relationship between 
the extent to which the firm utilizes an ambidextrous firm strategy and its 
customer satisfaction levels. 
Hypothesis 1d. There is a significant, positive relationship between 
the extent to which the firm utilizes an ambidextrous firm strategy and its 
volume of new product introductions. 
2.1.3 Mediating Effect of Functional Implementation 
It is one thing to formulate a strategy and it is quite another to successfully implement it 
(Bonoma 1984; Noble and Mokwa 1999). Firms that implement successfully take advantage of 
their organizational structure, systems, skills and capabilities in such a way that the firm achieves 
its strategy (Bonoma 1984; Bourgeois and Brodwin 1984; Varadarajan 1999). Functional units 
are central to achieving the balance between exploitation and exploration. These groups typically 
carry out activities that, among other things, create efficiency advantages, promote cross-
functional coordination and knowledge sharing, expand customer relationships and sense market 
insights that lead to new products. Functional units also interact with suppliers, distributors, 
alliance partners and other external constituencies. Without a strong execution orientation at the 
functional level, the firm’s translation of its strategy into effective action can be lost, severely 
hindering the firm’s chances of market success (Hambrick 1983; Nutt 1987; Walker and Ruekert 
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1987). Miscalculations in execution, the presence of information “silos”, and poor mid-level 
management can all derail the successful implementation of a sound strategy.  
The marketing function is uniquely positioned as the primary link between a firm and its 
customers (Day 1994; Moorman and Rust 1999; Wind and Robertson 1983). It ensures that the 
flow of revenue into the firm from customers is uninterrupted (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 
1999). Marketing activities are critically important to many of the functions and processes within 
most firms (Webster 1992), playing a prominent role in driving decision-making in areas such as 
customer satisfaction initiatives, pricing and new product development (Homburg, Workman, 
and Krohner 1999). Thus, the marketing function is positioned to potentially engage in a high 
degree of both exploitation and exploration activities.3 Balancing the tension between pursuing 
new directions in marketing without taking away from actions that secure current benefits is 
difficult (Cespedes 1990). However, if the marketing function can configure its activities to 
support the strategy, firm performance will be enhanced (Vorhies and Morgan 2003).  
The firm must be able to readily shift its focus back and forth between exploration and 
exploration in response to changes in its environment in order to successfully implement an 
ambidextrous strategy (Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004). To facilitate these shifts, the functional 
units must become “jugglers,” able to successfully keep multiple initiatives moving forward 
without losing sight of either competitors or customers (Kyriakopoulos and Moorman 2004; 
Tushman and O’Reilly 1996). Furthermore, the activities that the functional units such as 
marketing engage in generate feedback from key stakeholders (e.g., customers, suppliers). This 
information must be considered and integrated into the functional units’ existing actions, 
 
3 Examples of exploitation include product positioning, refining current products and services, and distribution. 
Exploration involves market research designed to spot trends, taking risks with new products and services, or 
entering new channels such as the Internet. 
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allowing them to adapt to changing market conditions and thereby stay competitive. Without 
well-developed skills, processes and capabilities at the functional level, an ambidextrous firm 
risks functional inertia or myopia that can create an imbalance between exploration and 
exploitation. Thus: 
Hypothesis 2a. Functional implementation of the firm’s strategy 
will mediate the relationship between its ambidextrous strategy and its 
revenue.  
Hypothesis 2b. Functional implementation of the firm’s strategy 
will mediate the relationship between its ambidextrous strategy and its 
profitability. 
Hypothesis 2c. Functional implementation of the firm’s strategy 
will mediate the relationship between its ambidextrous strategy and its 
customer satisfaction levels. 
Hypothesis 2d. Functional implementation of the firm’s strategy 
will mediate the relationship between its ambidextrous strategy and its 
volume of new product introductions. 
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2.2 EMPIRICAL STUDY 
2.2.1 Data Collection 
Data was collected via a mail survey of senior marketing managers in publicly-traded U.S. firms. 
A mail survey was appropriate as I had a specific sample of professional managers that I wanted 
to reach along with reliable contact information.4 A mail survey allowed a respondent to 
complete it on their own time and return it without pressure from the researcher. 
To ensure response consistency across a wide variety of companies, attention was 
focused in the survey on how the marketing function implements firms’ organizational strategies. 
I conducted both in-depth interviews and pre-tests with a dozen marketing managers to develop 
the survey instrument. Wherever possible, I used existing and established measures. The survey 
included questions relating to the key constructs, as well as firm-specific and key respondent 
information.  
I drew the sample of firms from a proprietary database maintained by a market research 
firm. The database aggregates its content from thousands of information sources and is regularly 
updated. The database includes over fourteen million publicly-traded and privately-held U.S. 
companies. Full corporate details, however, are provided for approximately 600,000 companies 
with annual revenues of at least $2.5 million. For this study, I concentrated only on publicly-
traded U.S. firms, allowing us to collect and to analyze publicly-available secondary data (e.g., 
 
4 An Internet survey was another potential method. However, with corporate e-mail security filters in place at most 
companies, there was no way to judge non-response rates or failed transmissions from Internet surveys. Phone 
surveys were inappropriate due to the extensive interaction time required with each manager to obtain information 
as well as scheduling calls and gatekeeper issues. 
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revenue, profit) for comparison purposes with the survey responses. Further, U.S. publicly-traded 
companies utilize a consistent method of accounting, permitting analysis across firms. From the 
list of U.S. publicly-traded firms, I randomly chose 1,250 firms that were used in the mail 
survey. 
The target respondent was a senior marketing manager in each firm who had extensive 
knowledge about the marketing function as well as an understanding of the firm-wide approach 
to the market. Past studies have demonstrated that senior managers – if selected with care – can 
provide information as reliable and as valid as that obtained from multiple firm respondents (Tan 
and Litschert 1994; Zahra and Covin 1993). The senior marketing manager in each firm was 
identified by referring to the top member of the marketing team as listed in the database. The 
continued employment of each senior marketing manager was then randomly confirmed through 
web site inspections or phone calls. 
A six-page survey was mailed to the key respondent at each of the 1,250 firms in the 
sampling frame, along with a postage-paid return envelope. Approximately four weeks after the 
initial mailing, non-respondents received a postcard reminder. Eight weeks after the first mailing, 
a second letter was again mailed to non-respondents to encourage response. 
Approximately 22% of the surveys originally mailed were undeliverable due to incorrect 
addresses, targeted respondents that were no longer with the firm, gatekeepers who prevented the 
questionnaire from reaching potential respondents, or corporate policies that prevented them 
from completing the survey. One hundred and thirty-five usable surveys were returned yielding 
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an overall response of 15%.5 Responses were obtained from both manufacturing (38%) and 
service (62%) firms. With respect to revenues, 27% of the firms had sales greater than $1 billion, 
45% had between $100 million and $1 billion in sales, and 28% reported less than $100 million 
is sales. 23% employed more than 5,000 people, 24% employed between 1,000 and 4,999 
people, 16% employed between 500 and 999 people, 27% employed between 100 and 499 
people, and 10% employed fewer than 100 employees. There were no significant differences in 
the responses obtained on key measures from early versus later respondents to the survey 
(Armstrong and Overton 1977).  
The key respondents held titles in the marketing function such as chief marketing officer, 
vice president, director or similar. To check the validity of the respondents, they were asked to 
provide information about the nature of their position, how long they have been in that position 
and how long they have worked at their firm. On average, survey respondents had held their 
positions for approximately five years. They indicated extensive knowledge of strategy (4.55/5.0 
scale) and implementation (4.54/5.0 scale) in their organizations, indicating that I was able to 
reach the appropriate respondents with the survey.  
2.2.2 Independent Construct Measures 
Ambidextrous Firm Strategy. I used the approach proposed by Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) to 
develop a measure of ambidextrous firm-level strategy. First, separate scales were constructed 
 
5 Menon, Bharadwaj, & Howell (1996) found that the average top management survey response rates are in the 
range of 15-20%. Slater and Olson (2001) reported a 22% response rate. Therefore, the response rate in this 
study is in-line with that of prior surveys of top managers. 
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for exploration and exploitation using measures adapted from Gibson and Birkinshaw (see 
Appendix B for specific measurement items). Six items were measured using a seven-point 
Likert scale format (1 = “strongly disagree,” 7 = “strongly agree”). The three items for 
exploitation (α = .83) loaded strongly on a single factor. The three items for exploration (α = .84) 
also loaded strongly on a single factor.6 I then calculated the average scores for each factor. 
Finally, I multiplied the average score for firm exploration by the average score for firm 
exploitation to create an overall measure of ambidextrous firm strategy. Use of this method 
allows a comparison of the results to those found in previous empirical studies, and it is 
consistent with the conceptualization of organizational ambidexterity as a two-dimensional 
construct where the two dimensions are complementary in nature.7 
Marketing Function Implementation. I used items adapted from Menon, Bharadwaj, 
Adidam, and Edison (1999) to assess the marketing function’s implementation of the firm’s 
ambidextrous strategy. Because the Menon et al. measures were originally proposed for 
marketing strategy implementation in general, I augmented the original set with additional items 
that were conceptually similar, and that survived both the managerial feedback and pre-test 
stages of the survey design (the final set of items are reported in Appendix A). After refinement, 
 
6 I also performed confirmatory factor analysis using LISREL 8 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996) to compare a two-factor 
model (exploration and exploitation) to a one-factor model. Fit indices for the two-factor model (χ2 = 27.07, df = 8, 
p < .001, GFI = .94, CFI = .95, IFI = .96) were superior to those observed for the one-factor model (χ2 = 76.61, df = 
9, p < .001, GFI = .84, CFI = .87, IFI = .87). A chi-squared difference test for the two-factor versus the one-factor 
model was significant, indicating that the two-factor model provides a superior fit to the data. 
 
7 Prior research has also conceptualized exploitation and exploration as complementary in nature with increasing 
returns (Colbert 2004; Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004; Levinthal and March 1993; Moorman and Slotegraaf 1999; 
March 1991). Therefore, a multiplicative model is appropriate as it accounts for the relative combinations of 
exploitation and exploration resources (Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004; Gupta, Smith, and Shalley 2006; He and 
Wong 2004). I also performed all analyses using an additive model, and obtained substantively equivalent results. 
The additive approach, however, assumes equal contributions from both exploration and exploitation. In practice, 
equal contribution is unrealistic and the precise contributions are difficult to quantify (March 1991). Only the 
multiplicative results are discussed further here, but the additive results are available from the author upon request. 
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this left four items measuring implementation of an exploitation strategy (α = .68) and four items 
measuring exploration implementation (α = .80). As before, a confirmatory factor analysis using 
LISREL 8 (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1997) comparing a two-factor model of marketing 
implementation (χ2 = 39.36, df = 19, p < .01, GFI = .93, CFI = .93, IFI = .93) to a one-factor 
model (χ2 = 67.49, df = 20, p < .0001, GFI = .89, CFI = .82, IFI = .83) showed that the former 
was statistically superior to the latter. I followed the same method used at the firm strategy level 
to calculate the implementation of an ambidextrous strategy at the marketing function level. 
First, I calculated the average scores for the exploitation and exploration dimensions separately, 
and then multiplied them together to arrive at an overall functional implementation score. 
2.2.3 Dependent Construct Measures 
Firm Performance.  Respondents provided subjective measures of four dimensions of 
performance using a seven-point Likert scale format (1 = “strongly disagree”, 7 = “strongly 
agree”). Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed that their firm’s 
performance exceeds that of their key competitors (Conant, Mokwa, and Varadarajan 1990) in 
terms of sales revenue, profitability, customer satisfaction, and number of new product 
introductions (see Appendix A). 
Although subjective measures of business performance have been shown to be generally 
consistent with objective performance measures (e.g., Hart and Banbury 1994), collecting 
objective data is important in survey research for validating the responses provided by the 
respondents (Han, Kim, and Srivastava 1998). Therefore, drawing on the COMPUSTAT 
database objective measures of both revenue and net profit were collected for each firm in the 
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sample (latest fiscal year).8 The COMPUSTAT database provides standardized financial data for 
more than nine thousand publicly-traded firms, allowing for comparability across data items.  
2.2.4 Control Variables 
Firm size is used as a control variable because numerous studies have demonstrated that larger 
firms are more advanced in terms of organizational processes and knowledge than smaller firms 
(Hage 1980). The economies of scale often found in larger firms place them in a position to reap 
the benefits of greater efficiencies, providing resources for exploration (Klepper 1996). 
However, larger scale and advanced organizational development may create rigidities (Leonard-
Barton 1992) and competency traps (Levitt and March 1988) that can inhibit exploration. 
Conversely, smaller firms have a harder time exploiting economies of scale. This can hinder 
small firms from extracting benefits in the short-term and reduce resources for future growth. In 
this study, firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of the number of firm employees. The 
number of firm employees at the end of the latest fiscal year was obtained from the 
COMPUSTAT database and supplemented where necessary with annual report information filed 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. I also controlled for the age of the firm given that 
younger firms might have less time to develop the processes, personnel and knowledge necessary 
 
8 Comparable, cross-industry objective measures for customer satisfaction and new product introductions are not 
available. For example, while the American Customer Satisfaction Index is available for a limited number of large 
firms, ratings are not available for most of the firms in the sample.  
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to become ambidextrous. However, I acknowledge that organizational inertia may prevent older 
firms from achieving this same goal (Klepper 1996; Tushman and Anderson 1986).9  
2.2.5 Discriminant Validity 
To assess the discriminant validity between the two latent variables, firm strategy and marketing 
implementation, I employed several methods. First, an analysis revealed that the correlation 
between the two latent variables (.69) was lower than .70, which is lower than the .85 rule of 
thumb. Providing further evidence, the average variance extracted for strategy (.78) and 
implementation (.57) are both higher than the squared correlation between the two 
(.69*.69=.4761) (Fornell and Larcker 1981).  Collectively, there is reasonable discriminant 
validity between the two variables. As the marketing implementation latent variable is self-
developed, it should be subject to further testing in future research.  
2.3 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Means, standard deviations and correlations among the variables are reported in Table 1. 
Hypotheses are tested using regression analysis. The control variables, firm size and age, were 
included in each regression. I examined the variance inflation factors from the regression models 
using the “vif” function in SAS for evidence of multicollinearity. Multicollinearity was not a 
problem for any of the models as all variance inflation factors were less than two. Furthermore, 
 
9 Four categories for firm age were created, calculated as time in business since inception: (1) less than five years, 
(2) five to ten years, (3) ten to twenty-five years and (4) greater than twenty-five years. 
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Brown-Forsythe tests for the threat of unequal variances for any of the variables in each equation 
were all not significant (p > .10) indicating the presence of homoscedasticity. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Essay 1, Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
 
Measure Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Ambidextrous firm strategy 21.89 10.37          
2. Marketing implementation 25.75 8.91 .69         
3. Revenue 4.79 1.81 .41 .40        
4. Profit 4.78 1.88 .41 .48 .65       
5. Customer satisfaction 4.91 1.35 .40 .45 .38 .50      
6. New product introductions 4.31 1.49 .29 .35 .26 .25 .15     
7. ln objective fiscal year revenue 19.51 1.84 .19 .24 .28 .30 .23 .13    
8. ln objective fiscal year net income* 17.14 2.06 .24 .28 .24 .25 .24 .15 .85   
9. ln number of employees 6.99 1.95 .13 .18 .20 .14 .14 .08 .85 .65  
10. Age of firm 4.32 1.01 -.04 .09 .12 .17 .12 .00 .43 .26 .45 
 
* Some firms had negative net income in the latest fiscal year and natural logarithms of those numbers can not be calculated. As a result, I use 
113 of 135 observations for this variable.   “Objective” indicates data drawn from COMPUSTAT.  
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2.3.1 Effect of Ambidextrous Strategy on Performance 
I hypothesized that an ambidextrous firm strategy should have a positive effect on business 
performance. A separate regression was run for each of the four dependent performance 
variables. The results are reported in Table 2. In support of Hypotheses 1a through 1d, all of the 
main effects of organizational ambidexterity on the various facets of performance were 
significant. More specifically, an ambidextrous firm strategy has a significant positive effect on 
both revenue (β = .07, p < .001) and profit (β = .08, p <. 001), supporting Hypothesis 1a and 
Hypothesis 1b, respectively. Similarly, customer satisfaction (β = .05, p < .001) and new product 
introductions (β = .04, p < .001) are also significantly and positively related to the extent to 
which the firm employs an ambidextrous strategy, supporting Hypothesis 1c and Hypothesis 1d. 
To forestall concerns that common method bias may be driving the significance of these 
relationships (i.e., both the organizational ambidexterity and performance measures are provided 
by the same respondent, and both represent subjective assessments), two additional regression 
equations were estimated using the reported revenue and profit data from COMPUSTAT. (Both 
measures of performance were transformed using the natural logarithm to normalize their 
distributions.) The results from these models are shown in the last two columns of Table 2. Both 
revenue (β = .02, p < .05) and profit (β = .04, p < .01) are still significantly and positively related 
to the firm’s use of an ambidextrous firm strategy. Although these latter effects are weaker than 
the subjective assessments, both sets of results are directionally and statistically consistent. 
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Table 2: Essay 1, Effect of Ambidextrous Firm Strategy on Performance 
 
 
------------------------ Survey -------------------- -------- Compustat -------- 
Dependent Variable Revenue Profit 
Customer 
Satisfaction
New Product 
Introductions 
Log 2005 
Revenue 
Log 2005 
Profit 
 
Hypotheses 
 
H1a: 
Supported
 
H1b: 
Supported
 
H1c: 
Supported
 
H1d: 
Supported 
 
H1a: 
Supported 
 
H1b: 
Supported 
       
Ambidextrous Firm Strategy .07*** .08*** .05*** .04** .02* .04** 
Log firm size .10 .01 .03 .04 .76*** .66*** 
Organizational age .16 .35* .16 -.01 .11 .13 
       
R2 .20 .20 .18 .08 .74 .46 
 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
 
 
 
 
2.3.2 Mediating Effect of Marketing Implementation 
I hypothesized that functional implementation mediates the relationship between ambidextrous 
firm strategy and business performance. To test for mediation, the analysis approach 
recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986) was followed. Already shown above (and in Table 2) 
is that when the mediator is not considered, ambidextrous firm strategy has a positive and 
significant relationship with all four dimensions of performance. Next, in step 2, I need to show 
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that there is a significant relationship between ambidextrous firm strategy and the mediator, 
marketing function implementation. This relationship is significant and positive (β = .59, p < 
.0001). Finally, to show that a mediation effect exists, I need to show that the significant 
relationship found in step 1 becomes insignificant when the mediator is added to the analysis.  
The results from this last step are shown in Table 3. Contrary to Hypothesis 2a, the link between 
ambidextrous firm strategy and revenue is not mediated by marketing implementation. However, 
marketing implementation does mediate the relationship between an ambidextrous firm strategy 
and profit (β = .07, p < .01), customer satisfaction (β = .05, p < .05), and new product 
introductions (β = .05, p < .01), supporting Hypothesis 2b, Hypothesis 2c and Hypothesis 2d. 
Additional analysis was then performed using Sobel tests to see if each of these mediator effects 
was significant. The Sobel test examines the combined effects of the path between a dependent 
variable and a mediator and the path between the mediator and the independent variable and is a 
more direct test of mediation (Sobel 1982). As expected, the mediator facilitates the relationship 
between an ambidextrous firm strategy and profit (3.16, p < .01), customer satisfaction (2.78, p < 
.01) and new product introductions (2.43, p < .05), but not for revenue (1.64, p > .10). 
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Table 3: Essay 1, Mediating Effects of Marketing Implementation 
 
Dependent Variable Revenue Profit 
Customer 
Satisfaction 
New Product 
Introductions 
Log 2005 
Revenue 
Log 2005 
Profit 
 
Hypotheses 
 
H2a: 
Not Supported 
 
H2b: 
Supported 
 
H2c: 
Supported 
 
H2d: 
Supported 
 
H2c: 
Supported 
 
H2d: 
Supported 
       
Ambidextrous Firm Strategy .05* .03 .02 .01 .01 .02 
Marketing Implementation .04 .07** .05** .05* .01 .03 
Log firm size .09 .00 .02 .03 .76*** .66*** 
Organizational age .13 .29 .12 -.05 .10 .12 
         
R2 .22 .27 .23 .13 .74 .46 
∆R2 .02 .07* .05* .05* .00 .00 
 
Note: The change in r-squared (∆R2) for the four dependent variables is the difference between the r-squared found in Table 2 and that found in 
Table 3. The asterisks denote a statistically significant change in the r-squared based on an F-test for each dependent variable. 
 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
 
 
 
2.3.3 Post-Hoc Analysis: Manufacturing versus Services Firms 
Gupta, Smith, and Shalley (2006) question whether all firms should be ambidextrous, or whether 
important, industry-specific differences exist. I seek to provide an initial answer to this question 
by exploring potential differences between manufacturing and services firms in terms of how 
ambidexterity is related to performance. Both manufacturing and service firms seek markets for 
their offerings that will generate revenues. As revenues do not account for the underlying costs 
incurred to provide the good or service, the results of successfully implementing firm strategy on 
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revenues should, all else equal, be similar for both manufacturing and services firms. However, 
inherent differences between manufacturing and services firms may affect the mediating impact 
of functional implementation on the relationship between ambidextrous firm strategy and some 
of the other performance variables discussed earlier. For example, manufacturing firms tend to 
place a heavier emphasis on capital investments and scale efficiencies in the production of 
tangible goods, potentially shifting manufacturing firms’ emphases to maximizing existing 
operations (i.e., an exploitation focus). This could potentially lead to improved profitability (in 
the short term), along with under-investment in innovation. The return on investment of new 
product development and risky endeavors is typically inefficient and is achieved over a longer 
term. If manufacturing firms are finding success in efficiency, they have little incentive to invest 
in less certain outcomes. Furthermore, services are generally more perishable than manufactured 
goods (Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 1985), and also tend to be more customized. 
Customization in turn means reductions in scale efficiencies (Anderson, Fornell, and Rust 1997) 
and lower immediate profits (Kirca, Jayachandran, and Bearden 2005). 
In a post-hoc analysis, I segregated respondents into manufacturing-oriented (n = 51) and 
service-oriented (n = 84) firms using the North American Industry Classification System coding 
structure as a guide. I then tested for mediation effects for each type of firm.10 The results of this 
moderated mediation are presented in Table 4, as are the separate main effects when the mediator 
is not included. For both manufacturing and service firms, when the mediator is not present an 
ambidextrous strategy has a significant positive impact on all four dependent performance 
measures, consistent with the full sample results. Furthermore, there is a significant positive link 
 
10 Due to the small size of the sub-samples, objective measures of performance are not included in these analyses. 
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between ambidextrous firm strategy and marketing implementation for both the manufacturing 
(β = .55, p < .0001) and service (β = .65, p < .0001) sub-samples.  
For the manufacturing firm sub-sample, the mediation results are consistent with the 
overall sample. The mediating effect of marketing implementation on the relationship between 
ambidextrous firm strategy and revenue is not significant, but all of the other strategy – 
performance links are fully mediated by functional implementation. In contrast, functional 
implementation does not mediate any of the ambidextrous strategy – performance relationships 
for the service firm sub-sample. 
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Table 4: Essay 1, Tests of Mediation: Manufacturing versus Services 
 
Dependent Variable Revenue Profit 
Customer 
Satisfaction 
New Product 
Introductions
 
Manufacturing ( n= 51):     
Main Effects     
Ambidextrous Firm Strategy .08*** .07** .05** .04* 
R2 .37 .22 .20 .11 
    
Mediation     
Ambidextrous Firm Strategy .08** .01 .01 .00 
Marketing Implementation .01 .10** .07** .07* 
R2 .37 .35 .32 .21 
∆ R2 .00 .13* .12* .10* 
    
Services (n = 84):     
Main Effects     
Ambidextrous Firm Strategy .06** .08*** .05*** .04* 
R2 .17 .19 .20 .10 
    
Mediation     
Ambidextrous Firm Strategy .02 .04 .03 .02 
Marketing Implementation .06 .06 .03 .04 
R2 .21 .23 .22 .12 
∆R2 .04 .04 .02 .02 
 
Note: Control variables were included in the tests for mediation. In virtually all cases, the results were non-significant. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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2.4 DISCUSSION 
Three key issues were examined in this study: (1) the mediating effect of functional 
implementation on the relationship between an ambidextrous firm strategy and performance; (2) 
performance variables that have not been explored in prior research but theoretically are 
expected to be positively affected by an ambidextrous firm strategy; and (3) differences between 
manufacturing and service firms in the tests of mediation. Each of these issues is discussed in 
turn below. 
2.4.1 Functional Implementation 
Using marketing as an example of functional implementation, many of the dimensions of 
performance in an ambidextrous strategy are increased through successful implementation. This 
reconfirms the critical role that functional units play as translators and implementers of firm 
strategy (Bonoma 1984; Bourgeois and Brodwin 1984; Hambrick 1983; Nutt 1987), but does so 
for the first time in the context of organizational ambidexterity. For example, customer 
satisfaction was positively affected in this study through strong implementation by the marketing 
function. This outcome speaks not only to the marketing function’s close relationship with the 
customer but also to its ability to balance competing demands on its resources. Close working 
relationships with customers are essential to enhancing firm value (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 
2000; Vargo and Lusch 2004). In an ambidextrous firm, these close interactions allow firms to 
sense and respond to customers’ future requirements while also improving the quality of its 
current products. 
  
 
41
Interestingly, no mediating effect was found for functional implementation in the 
relationship between ambidextrous firm strategy and revenue. It is possible that a different 
mediator may play a more important role in taking the strategy and translating it into actions that 
result in revenue enhancements. However, the results related to revenue underscore that it is 
important for managers to take a broad view of strategy – performance relationships. Different 
intermediaries (and moderators) can influence the success of an ambidextrous strategy and thus 
alternate pathways to desired performance must be examined. In this regard, my study 
demonstrates the marketing function’s contribution to the success of an ambidextrous strategy 
would be overlooked, to the firm’s detriment, if revenue were the sole focus of managers. 
These results do not speak to the potential importance of other functional areas in 
mediating the relationships between strategy and performance. To be truly successful, an 
ambidextrous strategy requires firm-wide implementation. As a next step, then, research should 
focus on evaluating other functional areas for possible mediating effects. This will help 
researchers to develop a more comprehensive picture of how an ambidextrous strategy can be 
most effectively implemented within organizations. Furthermore, this more robust understanding 
may facilitate inter-functional coordination and help avoid the emergence of “functional silos” 
within the firm. Prior research also suggests that team composition and dynamics affect the 
balance between exploration and exploitation (Beckman 2006; Perretti and Negro 2006). 
However, these studies do not account for within-function effects on firm ambidexterity. 
Combining these findings of the importance of functional units with research on team dynamics 
would be a fruitful extension. Finally, this study does not examine the size of the marketing 
function within each firm. Marketing departments in smaller firms, although publicly-traded may 
operate much differently than larger firms, thus impacting the firm’s ambidextrous approach. 
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2.4.2 The Multi-Dimensionality of Performance 
Previous empirical studies of ambidextrous organizations have found that organizational 
ambidexterity is significant and positively related with superior revenue performance (e.g., 
Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004; He and Wong 2004), and these results are consistent with this past 
work. However, I go one step further by using objective measures – drawn from COMPUSTAT 
– as well as subjective measures like those used in previous research, and find that both sets of 
revenue measures are positively linked to organizational ambidexterity.  
While revenue is certainly one important aspect of a firm’s overall performance, other 
performance dimensions such as profitability, customer satisfaction, and new product 
introductions also matter. Revenues allow firms to reinvest in order to develop the necessary 
knowledge, assets and intangible factors (Amit and Schoemaker 1993) that enable the firm to 
maintain its ambidextrous approach. At the same time, revenues are only one indicator of a 
successful ambidextrous strategy, and focusing too much on a single metric (such as revenue) 
may inadvertently lead the firm to shift its balance of emphasis from an ambidextrous strategy to 
exploration or exploitation.  
The empirical results show that profitability, customer satisfaction, and new product 
introductions are all significantly affected by an ambidextrous firm strategy. Profits can be used 
in innovative projects, enabling the firm to foresee and to adapt to changing market conditions. 
Profits can also be returned to stockholders, used for mergers and acquisitions, or distributed to 
key employees for talent retention. These actions reinforce the firm’s ability to balance 
exploitation and exploration. Second, effective ambidextrous firm strategies hinge on serving the 
current needs of the customer base and at the same time peering into the future for potential 
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opportunities. Similarly, firms must continue to introduce new products into the marketplace to 
respond to changing market conditions. If a firm can achieve both of these goals successfully, 
longer-term customer satisfaction should result, leading to increased customer commitment, 
greater loyalty, lower servicing costs, and higher customer switching costs (Garbarino and 
Johnson 1999). These outcomes provide the firm with the stability to allocate investments to 
both exploitation and exploration. 
While the results were robust across performance dimensions, future research should 
examine the same linkages using different measures of the outcomes. For example, how other 
measures of customer satisfaction such as the brand partner quality scale (Aaker, Fournier and 
Brasel 2004) are affected by exploitation and exploration may provide interesting insights. 
2.4.3 The Moderating Effect of Mediation in Manufacturing versus Services Firms 
Strong support for the mediating effect of functional implementation was observed for 
manufacturing firms in this study. The marketing function’s effective implementation of the 
firm’s ambidextrous strategy positively affected profitability, customer satisfaction, and new 
product introductions. These findings have important implications for manufacturing firms, 
which often operate in capital-intensive, highly competitive environments, and may therefore 
emphasize operational efficiencies at the expense of innovation. The results suggest that firms 
that not only achieve efficiencies but that also continue to explore new opportunities will 
outperform their counterparts focused solely on exploitation. Furthermore, the findings show that 
functional implementation (particularly the role played by marketing in linking the firm and its 
external customers) plays a key role in achieving this balance. 
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In contrast, the results do not demonstrate a mediating effect of functional 
implementation for services firms. This is not to say that implementation at the functional level is 
not important for services firms, however. For example, high customer satisfaction levels are a 
key goal of virtually all services firms, and this objective is likely to be widely communicated 
and implemented across these firms. Thus, the incremental effect of functional implementation 
(in this case by marketing) will be much smaller than is the case for manufacturing firms. 
Furthermore, the role or structure of marketing within services firms may be different that in 
manufacturing organizations. Again, in services firms, marketing may already be “front and 
center” in the firm to attract customers.  This study also provides a glimpse of service-oriented 
firms in the aggregate, and was not designed to investigate industry differences in detail. 
Services industries are complex and customer preferences that impact performance can vary 
widely. Understanding the nuances, if any, among various firm sub-types (e.g., retailers vs. 
professional services) is of key importance to managers and should be analyzed in greater depth 
in future research. 
2.4.4 Implications for Future Research 
This study provides a snapshot of how use of an ambidextrous strategy affects performance for 
the firms in this sample at a single point in time. However, some researchers (e.g., Tushman and 
O’Reilly 1996) have suggested that an ambidextrous firm strategy must be implemented over 
time. Even if the firm is able to strike an appropriate balance between exploitation and 
exploration at one point in time, it may not be able to sustain it over longer periods. For example, 
Tushman and O’Reilly (1996) note that Hewlett-Packard was once able to both effectively 
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exploit its existing markets while also exploring new opportunities. More recently, Hewlett-
Packard has failed to sustain this balance. Furthermore, there is considerable debate as to 
whether such a balance gain be achieved and sustained through ambidexterity, punctuated 
equilibria, or some other means (see Benner and Tushman 2003; Burgelman 2002; Christensen 
1998; Gupta, Smith, and Shalley 2006; Levinthal and March 1993). Determining which of these 
mechanisms is most likely cannot be accomplished using cross-sectional data. 
Thus, as a next step, it will be important to conduct a longitudinal analysis of the 
relationships studied here. Firms may be at different stages in the development of an 
ambidextrous strategy, and may thus be more focused on either exploitation or exploration at any 
particular point in time. Furthermore, development of an ambidextrous strategy may be driven in 
part by firm age, environmental conditions, or other factors. A longitudinal analysis may also 
shed light on obstacles that firms must overcome to reach a high degree of ambidexterity. These 
insights will allow managers to develop and to sustain an ambidextrous organization.  
To illustrate the importance of taking a broader view, the extent to which an 
ambidextrous strategy is likely to both be employed and be successful for an organization may 
depend heavily on the uncertainty in its operating environment. Dess and Beard (1984) suggest 
that three dimensions of the environment contribute most to environmental uncertainty and are 
thus most likely to consistently influence firm performance over time: environmental turbulence, 
munificence and complexity. For example, in a relatively stable business environment, any 
advantage achieved by a firm is likely to be sustained over an extended period of time (Miller 
and Shamsie 1996). Firms facing such a stable environment are likely to emphasize “static 
efficiency” at the expense of “dynamic efficiency” (Ghemawat and Costa 1993), and to exploit 
existing knowledge and capabilities rather than exploring new possibilities (Leonard-Barton 
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1992; Levinthal and March 1993; Levitt and March 1988). In contrast, in more turbulent 
environments many firm-specific advantages are short-lived as competitive and environmental 
pressures quickly undermine any resource value or heterogeneity (Foss 1998). The ability to stay 
on top of business trends and to quickly respond to changing market needs is critical for superior 
firm performance in such environments, placing a premium on ambidextrous – and/or 
exploration-focused – strategies. Further work should therefore examine the extent to which the 
success of an ambidextrous strategy is affected by the broader operating environment. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
Drawing on a broad, cross-industry sample of firms, I found in this study that the ambidextrous 
firm approach significantly affects performance only when successful implementation is evident 
at the functional level. Furthermore, I decomposed performance into four sub-facets and showed 
strong, positive links between an ambidextrous firm strategy and revenue, profit, customer 
satisfaction and new product introductions. Finally, I noted some important differences between 
manufacturing and services firms, suggesting that a deeper investigation of the causes of these 
differences is needed. This work demonstrates that organizational ambidexterity can be 
beneficial to firms, and that functional implementation is a key determinant of success. What is 
now needed is further investigation of the boundary conditions under which this success can be 
achieved, and sustained over time.  
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3.0  SECTION III: ESSAY II: DYNAMIC RETURNS TO INVESTMENTS IN 
EXPLOITATION AND EXPLORATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY  
A global survey of four hundred twenty-five executives highlighted a continuing battle for firms 
– that of creating competitive advantage by simultaneously exploiting existing markets and 
exploring new ones (Accenture 2005). An exploitation strategy primarily emphasizes satisfying 
the current customer base (e.g., Benner and Tushman 2003; Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 
1999), whereas exploration is primarily focused on investments in innovation and 
experimentation (Katila and Ahuja 2002). Theoretically, exploitation and exploration compete 
for scarce resources that inevitably require trade-offs within the firm (Cyert and March 1992). 
March (1991: 85) states: “The essence of exploitation is the refinement and extension of existing 
competencies and paradigms…The essence of exploration is experimentation with new 
alternatives.” These differing emphases create pressure on managers that can force many firms 
down a more focused exploitation or exploration path as opposed to simultaneously pursuing 
both.  
This paper seeks to address three limitations in this research stream. First, one of the most 
pressing needs is a better understanding of how firm exploitation and exploration capabilities 
change over time (Beckman 2006; Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006; Gupta, Smith, and Shalley 2006; 
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Tushman and O’Reilly 1996). March (1991) argues that though exploitation and exploration 
often compete for firm resources, balancing these demands over time is necessary for 
competitive advantage. This perspective suggests that investments in both exploitation and 
exploration must be made to create performance advantage. Firms that pursue a particular 
approach may, when evaluated at a single point in time or over just a few years, appear to be 
poor performers when compared to competitors (Hutt, Reingen, and Ronchetto 1988). Therefore, 
a dynamic examination provides a longer-term understanding of the contribution of exploitation 
and exploration to firm performance. 
Second, how exploitation and exploration capabilities impact forward-looking 
performance is surprisingly absent from this research stream. The potential carryover effects of 
capabilities imply that the future value of the firm is impacted by actions in a particular period. 
An understanding of how exploitation and exploration capabilities impact the future value of the 
firm, and in particular those investments with a sales,  marketing or new product nature, provides 
meaningful input from marketing to top management for short- and long-term strategic decision 
making (Day 1994; Srivastava and Reibstein 2005; Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1999). 
Moreover, the potential differences in the impact of these capabilities on forward-looking 
performance should then be linked to historical measures for a more detailed picture of the 
impact of firm actions.  
Finally, there is continuing debate as to whether or not performance advantages accrue to 
firms that effectively balance exploitation and exploration rather than focus on only one 
capability. Proponents suggest that the two emphases are complementary and can co-exist (see 
Benner and Tushman 2003; Christensen 1998; Gupta, Smith, and Shalley 2006; Levinthal and 
March 1993). Yet, detractors say that attempting to balance exploration and exploitation 
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strategies raises the risk of a firm being good at neither (e.g., Kotler 1997; Miles, Snow, Meyer, 
and Coleman 1978; Miller and Friesen 1986). A longitudinal evaluation of these relationships 
helps to clarify the potential benefits of a balanced strategy versus a focused one. 
Exploitation and exploration are conceptualized as capabilities in this study - the outputs 
generated from resource investments made by the firm (Grant 1996; Venkatraman, Lee, and Iyer 
2006; Winter 2003). Using longitudinal objective data from publicly-traded pharmaceutical 
firms, I first examine how firms maintain and modify exploitation and exploration capabilities, 
noting the positive spillover effects of cumulative prior year investments. I use stochastic frontier 
estimation, an input-output econometric technique that creates measures of efficiency for 
exploitation and exploration for each firm that are then compared to all firms for a given period. I 
then link capabilities to both historical and forward-looking performance, measured by Return on 
Assets and Tobin’s q respectively. Finally, I provide insight into the debate over whether or not a 
balanced (e.g., Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004) or a singular (e.g., Miller and Friesen 1986) focus 
is more appropriate with respect to exploitation and exploration capabilities. Figure 2 
summarizes the conceptual model. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Drawing on the resource-based view 
of the firm (RBV) as a theoretical foundation, the potential impact of exploitation and 
exploration capabilities - separately and combined - on performance is discussed. I argue that a 
dynamic perspective is critical to understanding how firm investments impact exploitation and 
exploration capabilities. Third, these relationships are tested using objective data (i.e., 
COMPUSTAT, SDC Platinum) from publicly-traded U.S. pharmaceutical firms. Fourth, I review 
the results and their implications, drawing comparisons between historical and forward-looking 
performance measures. Finally, limitations and suggestions for future research are discussed. 
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Figure 2: Essay 2, Conceptual Framework 
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3.1 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
3.1.1 The Resource-Based View of the Firm 
The resource-based view (RBV) provides a theoretical lens through which exploitation and 
exploration capabilities can be examined. RBV focuses on how firms can develop and sustain 
competitive advantage (Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997; Wernerfelt 
1984). In this paper, “resources” are defined as those stocks of knowledge, physical and 
intangible assets, human capital and other factors that a firm owns or controls (Capron and 
Hulland 1999; Amit and Schoemaker 1993). Capabilities are those complex bundles of resources 
that manifest themselves through firm-wide processes and help create competitive advantage 
(Amit and Schoemaker 1993; Day 1994; Dutta, Narasimhan, and Rajiv 1999). Capabilities are 
accrued slowly, are firm-specific (Barney 1991), and are reconfigured over time to meet market 
needs (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997). Differences in performance 
among firms are the result of the unique idiosyncratic, inimitable capabilities owned or otherwise 
controlled by the firm (Atuahene-Gima 2005; Amit and Schoemaker 1993; Barney 1991; 
Rindova and Kotha 2001). The differences in capabilities prevent other firms from understanding 
or duplicating the complexity and therefore the competitive advantages of market leaders (Reed 
and DeFillippi 1990). The complexity and path-dependent nature of exploitation and exploration, 
particularly in the process, skills and systems needed to master these capabilities, lends itself 
well to the resource-based view of the firm.  
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3.1.2 Exploitation and Performance 
A strategy that emphasizes exploitation focuses on satisfying the current customer base of a firm 
(e.g., Benner and Tushman 2003; Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1999). The satisfaction of the 
current customer base increases the potential for repeat purchases as well as positive word-of-
mouth, which can generate additional revenue for the firm (Oliver 1997; Reichheld 1996). 
Repeat purchasing also helps firms to become more efficient in serving existing customers, 
making them more profitable. Revenues and profits provide opportunities for reinvestment in the 
firm (e.g., capital expenditures, debt reduction, or employee retention), which further strengthen 
a firm’s hold on its customer base. Furthermore, the length of time between investments in 
exploitation capabilities such as sales force productivity improvements or expanded customer 
service and the recognition of benefits by the firm is shorter.  
These successful outcomes and shorter reward times then encourage managers to do more 
of the same, reinvesting profits into refinement and efficiency. March (1996, p. 280) noted that 
“exploiting often thrives on commitment more than thoughtfulness, narrowness more than 
breadth, cohesiveness more than openness”. This continuing cycle creates a performance 
advantage over those firms that are less focused on exploitation capabilities and thus less able to 
serve current customer needs. A firm that does not exploit also suffers from reduced profits and 
therefore has fewer resources to reinvest over time. Intangible outcomes, such as customer 
satisfaction and loyalty, are also negatively impacted as non-exploiters miss opportunities to 
serve the current customer base. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms that maintain stronger exploitation 
capabilities will have superior performance to other firms.   
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3.1.3 Exploration and Performance 
Exploration is focused on innovation, risk and experimentation to reach new markets and 
customers. These outcomes, however, are visible only over the longer-term, presenting difficult 
challenges for the firm (March 1991). Furthermore, the risk increases the potential for zero or 
negative return on investment exists. Yet, patenting new ideas or generating new products, 
central outputs of exploration, are critical to firm adaptation and survival (Mitchell and Singh 
1993; Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt, and Lyman 1990). Innovative firms that focus on these outputs 
can win market share from competitors and increase their own market value (Chaney and 
Devinney 1992; Shankar, Carpenter, and Krishnamurthi 1998). Therefore, exploration-focused 
firms are constantly seeking to improve performance through these activities.  
Research and development (R&D), for example, can increase risk but it can also promote 
flexibility to adapt to market changes (Miller and Bromiley 1990) and to generate improved 
performance (e.g., Jaffe 1986; Roberts 2001). Firms that maintain strong R&D can benefit from 
economics of scale and scope (Scherer 1980; Teece 1980), which can better position them for 
future innovations over the longer-term (Cohen and Klepper 1996). Joint ventures, alliances and 
mergers or acquisitions can also provide opportunities for exploration (e.g., Lavie and Rosenkopf 
2006; Prabhu, Chandy, and Ellis 2005; Wadwa and Kotha 2006). Acquisitions, for example, 
allow for the exchange of resources to help maintain strong capabilities (e.g., Capron and 
Hulland 1999). Pharmaceutical firms, for example, thrive on these types of arrangements, often 
relying on them to augment their own drug development pipelines. Alliances in the 
pharmaceutical industry also help to share the large-scale costs (estimated at $800 million to $1 
billion) of drug development and can speed time to market (Kumar and Nti 1998). Given the 
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characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry, these ventures can contribute to a firm’s 
competitive advantage (e.g., McEvily and Zaheer 1999; Singh and Mitchell 1996).  
Realizing the risks and natural inefficiencies, exploration-focused firms are less 
concerned with short-term growth, revenue and profitability and more focused on developing the 
skills and products that will meet the future needs of customers. Success encourages firms to 
continue developing new products to improve future markets (Cohen and Klepper 1996). 
Collectively then, exploration allows firms to adapt and reach new knowledge (Rosenkopf and 
Nerkar 2001) and reorient themselves to make “long jumps” (Levinthal 1997) that create 
performance advantage.  Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:   
Hypothesis 2: Firms that maintain stronger exploration 
capabilities will have superior performance to other firms.  
3.1.4 Balanced versus Focused Capability Development and Performance 
The literature on exploitation and exploration reveals considerable debate over the use of a 
balanced approach. Detractors posit that taking a focused approach is better for performance, as 
attempting to balance both exploration and exploitation strategies raises the risk of a firm being 
good at neither (e.g., Kotler 1997; Miles, Snow, Meyer, and Coleman 1978; Miller and Friesen 
1986). Even proponents of the balanced approach suggest that the effort required of the firm to 
support it can overwhelm the firm (Benner and Tushman 2002; Katila and Ahuja 2002). One of 
the reasons for this is that resources are spread thinly across the two capabilities, resulting in 
under-development of both. Another line of thinking is that, particularly for publicly-traded 
firms, the constant pressure from stock analysts and shareholders may prime managers to “make 
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earnings”, driving them to emphasize exploitation rather than exploration (Benner and Tushman 
2002). Pursuing both strategies could result in punishment in the form of lower stock prices, 
market value or credit ratings. Third, intense competitive actions can preclude firms from 
making the necessary actions to support both strategies. A loss in a key patent lawsuit, a 
competitor acquisition, or the surprise release of a competing product can force firms to make 
trade-offs that create an imbalance between the two strategies. Fourth, firm-wide shocks can 
disrupt the flow of resources to both capabilities, redirecting them to one or other or neither. 
Consider the experience of Merck after the widely-publicized legal troubles over its blockbuster 
drug, Vioxx. Its stock price plummeted. Merck embarked on a $5 billion cost-cutting effort to 
help growth efforts and re-focused on key areas of research, such as heart disease and cancer 
(Barrett 2006). Finally, the inherent challenges of mastering differing tasks may prohibit 
employees from mastering the necessary knowledge, skills and abilities required to develop dual 
capabilities. 
Focused strategies, however, have their own shortcomings. First, an over-emphasis on 
exploitation can stifle a firm’s ability to alter its course in a changing market (Cyert and March 
1992). Managers become less interested in building capabilities in exploration as the uncertainty 
and risk may mitigate their current success (Leonard-Barton 1992; Levitt and March 1988). 
Perhaps managers fail to see the potential longer-term benefits of exploration given the more 
distant outcomes (Levinthal and March 1993). As a result, exploitation-focused firms may find 
that they have ceded their competitive advantage to firms that are more willing to maintain 
stronger exploration capabilities. These initially favorable strategic choices become inferior 
capabilities in the longer run (Heriott, Levinthal, and March 1985). Second, exploration-focused 
firms that are unsuccessful can get trapped into a continuing cycle whereby “failure begets 
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failure” (March 1993). Managers tend to take too many risks or innovate without extracting 
profits (Levinthal and March 1993). By not investing in exploitation capabilities that refine 
process and make the firm more efficient, exploration-focused firms become particularly 
vulnerable to competitors, which can threaten survival.  
Proponents suggest that balancing exploitation and exploration strategies makes sense for 
many firms (e.g., Abell 1993; Williamson 1999), and may even be necessary for survival (e.g., 
Christensen 1998; Lewin and Volberda 1999). When used effectively, a dual approach limits 
both organizational inertia and management myopia (Levinthal and March 1993). Moreover, 
these capabilities are complementary and can generate many benefits for the firm (Atuahene-
Gima 2005; Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004; Katila and Ahuja 2002; Lewin and Volberda 1999).11 
The new knowledge gained from exploration is incorporated into exploitation. The insight 
gained from maximizing relationships with the current customer base is applied to generating 
new ideas, products and markets. The balanced approach helps the firm to continuously find new 
ways to maximize the current customer market while meeting the needs of future customers 
(Kyriakopoulos and Moorman 2004). For example, the effects of both exploration and 
exploitation are seen in new product introductions (Katila and Ahuja 2002; Kiriakopoulos and 
Moorman 2004). Profits generated by exploiting current products and services can result in 
valuable new product extensions (Griffin 1997); or be allocated to exploring new product 
development opportunities. Pharmaceutical firms often develop slightly different drugs (i.e. 
higher dose tablets or “extra strength” versions of a commercially-available drug) that protect 
 
11 The two emphases are seen as complements to one another, and thought of as orthogonal variables rather than two 
ends of a continuum. (For similar arguments, see Baum, Li, and Usher 2000; Koza and Lewin 1998; Nerkar 2003.) 
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and enhance its current market share while providing additional revenue for research and 
development.  
The repetition of exploitation and exploration processes embed these capabilities in the 
firm (Day 1994), creating barriers to entry for competitors (Bain 1956; Leonard-Barton 1992) 
and allowing it to better anticipate and respond to its market (Day 1994; Prahalad and Hamel 
1990). This leads to a performance advantage over firms that cannot duplicate these capabilities 
(Dierickx and Cool 1989; Day 1990; Amit and Schoemaker 1993; Reed and DeFillippi 1990). 
Summarizing the discussion, the following competing hypotheses are proposed: 
Hypothesis 3a: Firms that possess stronger capabilities in both 
exploitation and exploration (i.e., a balanced approach) will have 
superior performance to firms that emphasize either exploitation or 
exploration; 
 or,  
Hypothesis 3b: Firms that possess stronger capabilities in 
either exploitation or exploration (i.e., a focused approach) will have 
superior performance to firms that emphasize both exploitation and 
exploration. 
3.1.5 Exploitation and Exploration Capabilities: A Dynamic Perspective 
March (1991) argues that exploitation and exploration often compete for firm resources, and that 
balancing these demands over the longer-term, although difficult, is necessary for competitive 
advantage. Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) echo the longer-term nature of this effort: “It is not 
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enough to create a supportive context (for exploitation and exploration). It is when this 
supportive context creates the capacity for (exploitation and exploration) that performance gains 
are realized.” (p. 222). Tushman and O’Reilly (1996) posit that firms that simultaneously 
manage both exploitation and exploration “are systematically more ‘lucky’ than the competition” 
in terms of success (p. 5). The time dependent nature of maintaining capabilities supports these 
perspectives (Amit and Schoemaker 1993; Barney 1991). It follows then that a lack of 
investment as compared to competitors can negatively affect capabilities as well as firm 
performance. 
A proper evaluation of these capabilities appears to then be more appropriate from a 
longitudinal perspective. Firms that pursue the balanced approach, when evaluated at a single 
point in time or over just a few years, may appear to be poor performers when compared to 
single-focused exploitation or exploration firms (Hutt, Reingen, and Ronchetto 1988). When 
compared to exploitation-focused firms, for example, revenues or profitability may be 
substantially lower at a single point in time for exploration-focused or balanced firms.  
Given the potential dynamic effects of capabilities, it becomes important to understand 
the investments that a firm must make to bolster exploitation and exploration. One can think of a 
firm’s capabilities at the end of a period as influenced by two factors: 1) the cumulative effect of 
exploitation and exploration capabilities from prior periods on the current period (Dutta, 
Narasimhan, and Rajiv 1999; Shi et al. 2006); and, 2) the resource investments that a firm makes 
during the current period. A firm can increase its exploitation capability, for example, by 
spending on selling, general and administrative (SGA) to successfully reach its customer base, 
increase brand awareness or sales productivity. These actions help to cement the relationships 
(e.g., physicians, hospitals) that can then become a source of competitive advantage. A 
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significant cut in selling, general and administrative expenses for a pharmaceutical firm can 
leave fewer sales representatives to meet with physicians and less money for direct-to-consumer 
advertising. A firm’s exploitation capability could then stagnate or decline, negatively impacting 
performance. Increases in capital expenditures, which are investments in property, facilities and 
equipment that have longer-term benefits, are also important to properly service the current 
customer base. Examples include such things as building centrally located buildings that enhance 
customer support, making major renovations to improve brand image or purchasing equipment 
that increases employee productivity. Finally, an increase in receivables from the beginning to 
the end of the period reflects positive customer reactions to firm products (Dutta, Narasimhan, 
and Rajiv 1999). These are actual sales of a firm’s products that are not yet paid for but are 
usually scheduled to be collected within a few weeks or months of the transaction.  
Exploration capabilities, on the other hand, are enhanced by investments in research and 
development as well as in external affiliations such as joint ventures, alliances, or acquisitions. 
Current year research and development expenditures supply the resources for scientists and 
engineers to continue their work on patents and new products. Firms that are leaders in R&D 
tend to invest resources to maintain that position (Ofek and Sarvary 2003). External affiliations, 
such as entering into new alliances or mergers/acquisitions provide an infusion of knowledge and 
assets that can positively contribute to exploration capability. Consider that the drug discovery 
timeline for pharmaceutical companies averages seven to ten years or longer before benefits 
from investments are realized (Chandy, Hopstaken, Narasimhan, and Prabhu 2006). This 
requires up-to-date resources in the form of such things as facilities, knowledge, and personnel. 
Accounting for these investments in the model provides a more accurate estimation of 
management practice in capability development.  
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Summarizing this discussion, investments in exploitation and exploration maintain those 
capabilities over time. Moreover, the cumulative effect of capabilities carries over from period to 
period, providing a foundation for investments in the current period. Collectively then, the 
following set of hypotheses is proposed: 
Hypothesis 4a: Investments in selling, general and 
administrative will improve exploitation capabilities from one period 
to the next.   
Hypothesis 4b: Investments in capital expenditures will 
improve exploitation capabilities from one period to the next. 
Hypothesis 4c: Increases in receivables will improve 
exploitation capabilities from one period to the next.   
Hypothesis 5a: Investments in research and development will 
improve exploration capabilities from one period to the next. 
Hypothesis 5b: Investments in external arrangements will 
improve exploration capabilities from one period to the next. 
3.2 EMPIRICAL STUDY 
3.2.1 Overview 
The empirical study section is organized as follows. The research setting is presented first, 
followed by a discussion of the chosen dependent and control variables. Next, the two-step 
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method for hypothesis testing is described. In the first step, stochastic frontier estimation is used 
to develop separate exploitation and exploration capabilities for each firm in each period. The 
second-step then incorporates the capabilities estimates into a seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) model to formally test the relationships between firm investments and capabilities as well 
as between capabilities and performance.  
3.2.2 Research Setting: The Pharmaceutical Industry 1996 - 2005 
The context of this study is focused on one industry to limit cross-industry heterogeneity. 
Objective data from 276 publicly-traded pharmaceutical companies (SIC Code Number 2834) 
over a ten-year period from 1996 to 2005 provided a large database for study. U.S. publicly-
traded firms provide consistent measures of financial reporting and other publicly available 
documents cannot be obtained from many privately-owned firms.  
The pharmaceutical industry is a good setting for this study as firms must seemingly 
maintain strong capabilities in exploitation and exploration for longer-term competitive 
advantage. Global drug revenue has slowed to single-digit growth in the past several years and 
approximately seventy leading drugs with an aggregate worth of $62.6 billion scheduled to go 
off patent between 2006 and 2010. (Standard & Poor’s, “Industry Surveys, Healthcare: 
Pharmaceuticals,” November 2, 2006, p.12). Drug development pipelines are getting longer, 
sometimes a decade, and more expensive. The costs of drug development are skyrocketing to 
near $1 billion. Regulatory obstacles prevent 95% of drugs from ever reaching the consumer 
(November 10, 2006 Standard & Poor pharmaceutical industry report). Patents are challenged by 
generic drug makers, increasing competition, lowering prices and margins. Some estimates are 
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that even after drugs are commercialized, only three in ten recoup or exceed the costs of 
development (Grabowski, Vernon, and DiMasi 2002).  
Those firms that have strong capabilities in exploitation and exploration can be market 
leaders. A Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development report in September 2006 estimated 
that firms who can successfully move drugs quickly through the development and regulatory 
hurdles can gain about $1 billion in incremental drug revenue while saving $30 million in costs 
over competitors. The rise of biotechnology firms has created a number of alliance or acquisition 
opportunities. Surprisingly, many of the pharmaceutical firms go through periods of imbalance, 
creating an interesting context for studying how (or if) firms can be successful in an environment 
where both exploitation and exploration capabilities appear to be necessary for competitive 
advantage.  
3.2.3 Dependent Variables 
Tobin’s q. Prior literature relies almost exclusively on historical financial measures of 
performance such as revenue and profit. In this study, a more forward-looking measure of a 
firm’s market value, Tobin’s q, is used as the dependent variable as the resource investments in a 
firm’s capabilities impacts firm performance over several future time periods. Tobin’s q is the 
ratio of the firm’s market value to the current replacement cost of the firm’s assets. Replacement 
cost is an indicator of alternative uses of a firm’s assets such that a ratio of q > 1 shows that firms 
are creating value by their resource investments. It is a forward-looking measure that 
incorporates firm risk and avoids issues related to methods of accounting (Montgomery and 
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Wernerfelt 1988). Drawing on the Compustat database, the Tobin’s q calculation for this study 
follows the Chung and Pruitt (1994) model:  
 q = MVE + PS + DEBT/TA 
 
Where: 
MVE = closing price of shares at the end of the financial year (Compustat Data 
24) x # of common shares outstanding (Compustat Data 25) 
PS = liquidation value of the firm’s outstanding preferred stock (Data 10) 
DEBT = (current liabilities – current assets) + book value of inventories + long-
term debt ((Data5 – Data4) + Data3 + Data9) 
TA = book value of total assets (Data 6) 
 
Return on Assets. Return on assets (ROA) is a historical measure of performance and is 
measured as the ratio of net income before extraordinary items over total assets. Using data from 
Compustat, an ROA measure was calculated for each firm in each period of the study. 
Incorporating ROA into the analysis allows a historical versus forward-looking comparison of 
the effects of exploitation and exploration capabilities on performance.  
3.2.4 Control Variables 
Two control variables are used to account for variation across firms. Age of firm (AGE) is 
marked from the date of incorporation. Prior research suggests that, with regard to exploration, 
firm age affects the rate at which firms patent (Sorensen & Stuart, 2000). Younger firms might 
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have less time to develop the processes, personnel and knowledge necessary for strong 
capabilities. However, organizational inertia may prevent older firms from achieving this same 
goal (Klepper 1996; Tushman and Anderson 1986). Firm size (SIZE) is measured as the natural 
log of the number of employees per firm per year. Larger firms are more advanced in terms of 
organizational processes and knowledge than smaller firms (Hage 1980). The economies of scale 
often found in larger firms place them in a position to reap the benefits of greater efficiencies, 
providing resources for exploration (Klepper 1996). However, larger scale and advanced 
organizational development may create core rigidities (Leonard-Barton 1992) and competency 
traps (Levitt and March 1988) that can inhibit exploration. Conversely, smaller firms have a 
harder time exploiting economies of scale. This can hinder small firms from extracting benefits 
in the short-term and reduce necessary resources for future growth.  
3.2.5 Capabilities Estimation 
Stochastic Frontier Estimation Method. Firm capabilities are conceptualized as the outputs 
obtained from resource inputs. Stochastic frontier estimation (SFE) is an econometric method 
that captures this input-output effect by estimating the capability of each firm and then 
comparing it against competitors (Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt 1977). SFE specifically allows 
for a two-part error term that captures both inefficiency in firm capabilities and inherent 
randomness, which is better suited for this data set than other econometric methods. An 
alternative method, data envelopment analysis (DEA) was considered. DEA is a nonparametric 
technique that calculates a similar measure of efficiency (Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes 1978). 
However, DEA does not allow for randomness derived from events outside of the firm’s control 
(For a review see Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt 1977; Bauer 1990). Following Dutta, Narasimhan, 
and Rajiv (1999), the SFE model is the maximization of an objective function that takes the 
following form:  
(1)  Yit =  itititX ηεα −+∫ ),( ,
where Yit is the output for the ith firm in the tth time period, Xit is the vector of resource 
investments, or inputs, and α is the vector of coefficients for the associated input variables. The 
two-part error term, εit - ηit, represents vectors of stochastic error (random shocks outside of 
management control that influence the variables) and inefficiency error (omitted variables) 
respectively. The random error component, εit, is assumed to be independent and identically 
distributed with a mean 0 and variance σ2ε ~ N(0,σ2ε ). The inefficiency error component, ηit, is 
assumed to be non-negative, independent and identically distributed with a mean µ and variance 
σ2η ~ N(µ,σ2η) with a half-normal distribution. The error terms are also assumed to be 
independent of each other as well as of the independent variables.  
A maximum likelihood estimate for the exploitation and exploration capabilities for each 
firm in each period can then be obtained by following the Cobb-Douglas formula set forth by 
Dutta, Narasimhan, and Rajiv (1999) and Battese and Coelli (1988): 
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Rearranging Equation (2) results in the following input-output capability model: 
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Equation (3) is a ratio of inputs to outputs such that the resulting individual firm 
capabilities have values between zero and one. Higher estimates represent stronger capabilities. 
SFE then compares the entire set of capability estimates for a given time period, creating a 
“frontier” of efficiency of all firms. This method provides a more accurate evaluation of 
competition across firms, given a suitable dataset. In this study, I ran twenty SFE models, one for 
exploitation and one for exploration in each period for ten periods. So, for example, Bristol-
Myers Squibb had twenty SFE estimates for 1996 to 2005, one in each period for exploitation 
and one for exploration. A summary of inputs and outputs used in the capabilities estimations is 
presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Essay 2, Summary of Variables for Capabilities Estimates 
 
 
Variable Measure Source 
Exploitation   
SALES Yearly revenues Compustat 
SGA Yearly selling, general and 
administrative expenses 
Compustat 
REC End of period accounts 
receivable balance 
Compustat 
CAPEX Yearly capital expenditures on 
tangible assets that support the 
firm 
Compustat 
   
Exploration   
PATENTCUM Cumulative patents USPTO/Delphion 
R&D Exponentially smoothed 
cumulative measure 
Compustat 
JVMA Combined count of joint 
ventures, alliances and M&A 
activity for each period as a 
measure of externally-oriented 
exploration 
SDC Platinum 
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Exploitation Capability. A firm’s capability in exploitation is how efficiently it utilizes its 
resources to successfully serve the current customer base. A firm’s sales are a key indicator of its 
success with its customer base (e.g., Dutta, Narasimhan, and Rajiv 1999). Sales (SALES), is the 
output variable and is defined in this study in U.S. dollars for a firm for each year. Drawing on 
prior research (e.g., Dutta, Narasimhan, and Rajiv 1999; Shi et al. 2006), the measures for the 
key inputs that influence the output, firm sales, are: (1) Receivables, (2) Selling, General and 
Administrative, and (3) Capital expenditures. Receivables (REC), or claims in lieu of cash 
against customers for sales, provide an indication of the interest of the customer base in a firm’s 
products and services. This amount is drawn from a firm’s balance sheet. Increases in a firm’s 
receivables suggest a stable or growing interest in a firm’s products over the longer-term. 
Selling, general, and administrative expenses (SGA) includes a firm’s costs to maintain its sales 
force that serves its current customer base. This expense is found on a firm’s income statement. 
In the pharmaceutical industry, sales representatives are a particularly large cost as they are 
tasked with directly interacting with physicians and hospital representatives who then prescribe 
the drugs for end user customers, the patients. As a result, the sales force is a significant driver of 
sales. Also included in SGA are advertising expenses. Research indicates that strong advertising 
investments promote sales (e.g., Leone 1995), thus benefiting the firm’s exploitation capability, 
as well as recognition and broad stock ownership, which thru the exploitation capability can 
potentially improve the overall market value of the firm (Frieder and Subrahmanyam 2005; 
Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston 2004). The pharmaceutical industry often relies heavily on direct-
to-consumer marketing of their products to raise interest such that consumers ask healthcare 
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providers about them.12 Finally, capital expenditures (CAPEX) are a firm’s yearly expenditures 
on new assets or on upgrading existing ones. CAPEX expenses are such things as new 
equipment, buildings, or land that enhance a firm’s efficiency in serving its customer base.  
Following Dutta, Narasimhan, and Rajiv (1999), the Cobb-Douglas formulation is used to 
specify the exploitation frontier model for i firms in t years, taking the logarithm of both sides:  
(4)  ln(SALESit) = α + Σ α x ln(RECit) + α x ln(SGAit) + α x ln(CAPEXit) + εit - ηit . 
 
Rearranging the model results in the following input-output capability model: 
 (5) Exploitit = ____________________ln(SALESit)______________________ 
α + Σ α x ln(RECit) + α x ln(SGAit) + α x ln(CAPEXit) + εit - ηit 
 
Exploration Capability. A firm’s capability in exploration is how efficiently it utilizes its 
resources to capture new markets and customers. I use cumulative patents (PATENTCUM) as 
the output variable.13 Patents are an important source of advantage in exploration in general but 
are particularly critical in the pharmaceutical industry (Levin et al. 1987). By its nature, the 
pharmaceutical industry places a strong emphasis on obtaining patents in support of drug 
development (Arundel and Kabla 1998). Furthermore, patents demonstrate a strong competitive 
                                                 
12 Compustat does not provide a full data set for advertising. However, advertising is captured in SGA line item. A 
review of firm annual reports suggests that a large number of pharmaceutical companies in this data set do not 
separately present these expenditures.  
13 In an optimal scenario, the number of new product launches per year per firm would be a strong indicator of a 
firm’s exploration capabilities. A product launch represents a firm’s total effort of exploration, encompassing the 
results of resource investments in research, join ventures, etc. To this end, data on Food & Drug Administration drug 
approvals for each firm was collected. However, data on commercialized product launches was not available due the 
cost of third-party research services. Due to the SFE technique and the volume of observations across time periods, 
the FDA data does not product enough observations to statistically examine capabilities. The correlation between 
patents and FDA approvals was positive and significant (β=.17, p < .01). As FDA drug approvals almost guarantee 
the commercial launch of a new product in the pharmaceutical industry, the correlation suggests that patents are an 
acceptable proxy for new products in the pharmaceutical industry.  
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market position, which can increase cash flows (Bunch and Smiley 1992) and market value 
(Aaker and Jacobsen 1994).  
The Delphion database, which is a subscription service that aggregates patent data from 
the United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) in a format that is easier to use for data 
analysis purposes, provides the data for a measure of firm patents. The three-digit class (#514 – 
drugs/bio-affecting compositions) is used by the USPTO for pharmaceutical products and was 
the focus for patent data collection in this study. First, I counted the number of patents granted to 
each firm in my sample from the period 1986 to 2005, resulting in approximately 17,800 patents. 
The USPTO designates an assignee company as the holder of the patent. Companies that shared 
assignee status were each given credit for a patent in the count of the data. The count was started 
in 1986 instead of 1996 is that patents are often the result of resource investments over a number 
of years. Furthermore, multiple patents are often reflected in a single new drug product. 
Beginning a count of cumulative patents in 1996 would not reflect the reality of capability 
development. This method provides a more refined and accurate picture of management practice 
in exploration. After completing the per-year per-firm count analysis, cumulative measures of 
patents for each firm for each year were calculated.  
The inputs that impact a firm’s cumulative patents are: (1) Research and development 
(R&D), and (2) External arrangements (e.g., joint ventures, acquisitions). R&D expenses are a 
main driver of patents and new products (Chaney and Devinney 1992; Shankar, Carpenter, and 
Krishnamurthi 1998). Following Dutta, Narasimhan, and Rajiv (1999), a cumulative measure of 
R&D was estimated using an exponential smoothing method that accounts for prior and current 
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year expenditures.14 Research and development expenses, however, are typically sourced from 
inside the firm and fail to account for a firm’s external investments in exploration capabilities. 
External investments such as joint ventures, alliances and acquisitions (JVMA) are also 
incorporated as an input as they are important sources of exploration (e.g., Lavie and Rosenkopf 
2006; Prabhu, Chandy, and Ellis 2005; Wadwa and Kotha 2006). For exploration-oriented 
companies, these “voluntary arrangements” allow firms to learn from other firms typically by 
sharing information for the purpose of developing new products or services (Gulati 1998; 
Levinthal and March 1988). To that end, a global measure of a firm’s external exploration 
activities JVMA helps to provide a more refined measure of its capability. The SDC Platinum 
database provided the data necessary to develop a count of mergers and acquisitions as well as 
joint ventures/alliances for each firm for each year in the sample. A search in the 2834 SIC code 
(Pharmaceutical Preparations) resulted in more than 1,100 external ventures for the firms in the 
sample. The separate per-firm per-year counts of joint ventures/alliances and 
mergers/acquisitions are combined into a global measure for each firm for each year. The count 
method provides a more refined measure of external exploration rather a more simplistic, binary 
“yes/no” approach (Prabhu, Chandy, and Ellis 2005). Furthermore, few firms segregate financial 
data to reflect joint ventures and alliances, thus forcing the use count data.  
Collectively then, these inputs are firm-specific assets and knowledge that can positively 
influence the firm’s exploration capabilities. Using SFE, this frames the combination of inputs 
and the ensuing output as the “efficiency of exploration” and the Cobb-Douglas specification for 
the frontier model for i firms in t years, taking the logarithm of both sides is: 
 
14 The following model was used to calculate the R&D measure: R&Dt = (1-λ)R&Dt + λ(R&Dt-1) with λ =.3.    
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(6) ln(PATENTS) = α + Σ α x ln(R&Dit) + α x ln(JVMAit) + εit - ηit . 
 
Rearranging the model results in the following input-output capability model: 
(7) Exploreit =    ____________ln(PATENTS)_______________ 
 α + Σ α x ln(R&Dit) + α x ln(JVMAit) + εit - ηit 
  
Two hundred and seventy-six firms were evaluated over the period 1996-2005, 
potentially providing 2,760 capability estimates each for exploitation and exploration. However, 
some of these firms were not publicly-traded during the entire ten-year period and so all 
observations were not available. As a result, there are 3,814 capability estimates, 1,907 each for 
exploitation and for exploration. To obtain the estimates, the data was segregated into ten periods 
for 1996-2005. Then, the frontier command in STATA 9 was used, which uses maximum 
likelihood estimation to develop average coefficients for all the observations in a given year as 
well as individual firm estimates for exploitation and exploration capabilities. In total, twenty 
separate frontier models were run to develop the 3,814 capability estimates. As specified by the 
input-output ratio in Equations (5) and (7), all individual capability estimates range between 0 
and 1, with higher estimates corresponding to firms with stronger capabilities as compared to 
other publicly-traded companies in a given year.  
The weighted average results of the stochastic frontier models for the ten-year period in 
this study are summarized in Table 6. For exploitation, REC (β = .34, p < .01), SGA (β = .30, p < 
.01), and CAPEX (β = .36, p < .01) all have a significant and positive influence on the output 
variable, firm sales. For exploration, R&D (β = .58, p < .01) shows a strong significant, positive 
influence on exploration capabilities as represented by cumulative patents. The global measure 
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of joint ventures and mergers and acquisitions (β = .11 p < .10), while significant and positive in 
many years, has a marginally significant impact in the aggregate.  
  
 
 
Table 6: Essay 2, Exploitation and Exploration Capability Estimates 
 
 Exploitation 
Capability 
 Exploration 
Capability 
Output variable: ln sales Output variable: ln cumulative patents 
 
 
Input Variables 
Weighted 
Average 
Effect 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
 
Input Variables 
Weighted 
Average 
Effect 
 
Standard 
Error 
ln(RECEIVABLES) .34** .04 ln(R&D) .58** .06 
ln(SGA) .30** .06 ln(JVMA) .11()  .05 
ln(CAPEX) .36** .05    
 
** p < .01; * p < .05; () p<.10 
 
 
3.2.6 SUR Model 
This section discusses the components of the SUR model. The seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) estimation technique is appropriate for this situation because the error terms (ε1, ε2, ε3) 
and the dependent variables can be correlated. SUR produces more robust coefficients than 
ordinary least squares regression (Zellner 1962).  
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First, the influence of how prior period capabilities coupled with current period resource 
investments (or lack thereof) impact the end of period exploitation and exploration levels is 
discussed. Once these relationships are understood, the impact of the exploitation and 
exploration capabilities on firm performance can then be separately tested. Finally, each firm’s 
exploitation and exploration capabilities for each period can be combined to test the interactive 
effect. I examined the variance inflation factors for evidence of multicollinearity, but this was not 
a problem. Means, standard deviations and correlations among the variables are reported in 
Table 7.  
The dynamic nature of exploitation and exploration capabilities is captured in Equations 
(8) and (9). The current year exploitation and exploration capabilities each include the 
cumulative effect of their respective capabilities from prior periods and the resource investments 
that a firm makes during the current period. For exploitation, current year expenditures in 
selling, general and administrative (SGA) and capital expenditures (CAPEX) as well as the 
change in receivables from the beginning of the period to the end (CHGREC) impact the end of 
period capability level. For exploration, current year expenditures in research and development 
(R&D) as well as external assistance in the form of joint ventures, alliances or 
mergers/acquisitions (JVMA) impact the end of period capability. Firm size and age are 
incorporated as control variables. 
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Table 7: Essay 2, Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Measure Mean 
(s.d.) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Change in 
receivables 
14.46 
(287.26) 
              
2. SGA 560.78 
(1940.51) 
.27**              
3. Capital 
expenditures 
111.59 
(367.49) 
.27** .91**             
4. Research and 
development 
250.53 
(916.66) 
.45** .86** .84**            
5. JVs/Alliances/ 
M&A  
.60 
(1.49) 
.09** .31** .27** .27**           
6. Exploitation 
capability  
.28 
(.20) 
.06** .11** .12** .10** .09**          
7. Exploitation 
capability t-1 
.18 
(.21) 
.02 .14** .16** .13** .12** .53**         
8. Exploration 
capability  
.16 
(.19) 
.05* .30** .32** .27** .06** .10** .17**        
9. Exploration 
capability t-1 
.10 
(.17) 
.01 .30** .32** .26** .11** .11** .35** .90**       
10. Performance 
(Tobin’s q)  
4.58 
(7.95) 
-.01 -.05* -.05* -.05* -.06* -.16 -.15 .03 .03      
11. Performance 
(Tobin’s q) t-1 
4.95 
(68.49) 
-.001 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.06* .005 -.02 .01 .10**     
12. ROA -.54 
(1.61) 
.04() .12** .12** .10** .10** .21** .21** .06** .06** -.42** -.07**    
13. ROA t-1 -.35 
(1.47) 
.02 .10** .11** .09** .09** .19** .04* .03 -.03 -.30** -.28** .45**   
14. Firm age 25.38 
(33.64) 
.07** .60** .61** .51** .21** .20** .23** .31** .29** -.02 -.02 .09** .05*  
15. Firm size (‘000s 
employees)  
-1.64 
(2.55) 
.21** .62** .65** .57** .34** .30** .34** .29** .29** -.28** -.07** .37** .31** .60** 
 
** p < .01; * p < .05; () p<.10 
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Equation (10) captures the relationships among a firm’s exploitation capability, its 
exploration capability, and forward looking performance.15 To calculate the interaction, 
exploitation and exploration estimates for each firm in each period are mean-centered and then 
multiplied together. The series of three regressions in the SUR model are now as follows:  
(8) ExploitCapt,i = γ0 + γ1SGAt,i + γ2CAPEXt,i + γ3CHGRECt,i + γ4ExploitCapt-1,i + 
γ5Aget,i + γ6lnEmployeest,i + ε1i 
 
(9) ExploreCapt,i = δ0 + δ1R&Dt,i + δ2JVMAt,i + δ3ExploreCapt-1,i + δ4Aget,i + 
δ5lnEmployeest,i  + ε2i 
 
(10) Tobin’s qt,i = ζ0 + ζ1ExploitCapt,i + ζ2ExploreCapt,i + ζ3ExploitCapt,i*ExploreCapt,i + 
ζ4Aget,i + ζ5lnEmployeest,i + ζ6Tobin’s qt-1,i + ε3i   
3.2.7 SUR Results 
The results from the SUR model are presented in Table 8. The bottom of Table 8 shows that the 
Breusch-Pagan tests of independence for the both models are significant. These results indicate 
that because of correlations among the error terms, the SUR model cannot be collapsed into a 
single ordinary least squares regression. For the Tobin’s q model, the r-squares for the three 
regressions are: exploitation (R2 = .30), exploration (R2 = .81), and performance (R2 = .12). For 
the ROA model, the r-squares for the three regressions are: exploitation (R2 = .30), exploration 
(R2 = .81), and performance (R2 = .27). Each of the chi-squared tests is significant indicating 
significant model fit.    
 
15 For historical performance, Equation (10) is the same but substitutes ROA for Tobin’s q as the dependent and lag 
performance variables. 
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Table 8: Essay 2, Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results 
 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Tobin’s q 
Dependent Variable: 
ROA 
 Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Exploitation     
SGA (‘000s)  .007         (.048)  .007         (.048) 
Capex (‘000s) -.029         (.026) -.029         (.026) 
Change in REC (‘000s)  .030*       (.013)  .030*       (.013) 
Exploitation t-1  .462*       (.020)  .462*       (.020) 
Firm Age  .000215         (.000164)  .000210         (.000164) 
Log of Firm Size .014**     (.002)  .014**     (.002) 
Constant .181**     (.010)  .181**     (.001) 
R2 .30  .30  
Chi-squared 816.25**  820.21**  
Exploration     
R&D (‘000s)  .007*         (.003)  .007*         (.003) 
JVMA  -.007**     (.001) -.007**      (.001) 
Exploration t-1  .915**      (.011)  .915**       (.011) 
Firm Age  -.000060        (.000081)    -.000060          (.000081) 
Log of Firm Size  .003*       (.001)  .003*        (.001) 
Constant  .034*        (.004)  .034*        (.004) 
R2  .81   .81  
Chi-squared 7789.93**  7789.92**  
Performance     
Exploitation t -7.467**      (.888)  1.535**         (.163) 
Exploration t  4.011**      (.941)  -.078           (.172) 
Exploit t x Explore t  4.293          (4.565)  -.152           (.832) 
Performance t-1    .007**      (.002)   .323**       (.019) 
Firm Age    .050**      (.007)  -.008**       (.001) 
Log of Firm Size -1.141**     (.088)   .185**       (.017) 
Constant  1.265**     (.334)   .131*        (.061) 
R2    .12    .27  
Chi-squared 332.68**  817.66**  
Breusch-Pagan Independence Test 28.871**  44.459**  
 
** p < .01; * p < .05; () p<.10  
  
 
78
                                                
H1 predicts that firms that maintain stronger exploitation capabilities will have superior 
performance to other firms. However, the bottom portion of Table 8 shows that a firm’s 
exploitation capability on average at time t has a significant negative effect on firm performance 
as expressed by Tobin’s q (β = -7.467, p < .01). Therefore, H1 is not supported. For comparison 
purposes, a firm’s exploitation capability on average at time t has a significant, positive effect on 
ROA (β = 1.535, p < .01).16   
H2 predicts that firms that maintain stronger exploration capabilities will have superior 
performance to other firms. Table 8 shows that a firm’s exploration capability on average at time 
t has a significant positive effect on performance as expressed by Tobin’s q (β = 4.011, p < .01). 
Therefore, H2 is supported. For comparison purposes, the effect of a firm’s exploration 
capability on average at time t on ROA is not significant.  
H3a posits that firms that maintain stronger capabilities in both exploitation and 
exploration will have superior performance than those firms that do not. A rival hypothesis, H3b, 
predicts that firms that develop superior capabilities in either exploitation or exploration will 
have greater performance than those firms that attempt to manage both. The bottom model of the 
Tobin’s q column in Table 8 shows the results. The effect of the interaction, Exploit t x Explore 
t, is not significant for Tobin’s q. Overall, H3a is not supported. H3b is partially supported by the 
positive effect of exploration on Tobin’s q. Again, comparing forward-looking to historical 
performance, the interaction did not have a significant effect on ROA. There is partial support 
for the competing hypotheses by the positive effect of exploitation on ROA. 
 
16 I also ran SUR models using net income and earnings per share as measures of performance. The results were 
substantially similar to those found in the ROA model.  
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The lag effect of Tobin’s q has a small positive effect on firm performance (β = .007, p < 
.01). The two control variables, firm age (β = .05, p < .01) and firm size (β = -1.141, p < .01) 
both have a significant effect on firm performance, although different directions. The lag effect 
of ROA has a positive effect on firm performance (β = .323, p < .01). The two control variables 
for ROA show the opposite results from Tobin’s q. Firm age (β = -.008, p < .01) and size (β = 
.185, p < .01), have a significant effect on performance, although again in different directions. 
The top portion of Table 8 under the Tobin’s q column shows the effects of firm 
investments on its exploitation capability. H4a predicts that firms that make investments in SGA 
expenses will have stronger exploitation capabilities than other firms. The effect of SGA on 
exploitation, however, is not significant and H4a is not supported. H4b predicts that firms that 
make investments in capital expenditures will have stronger exploitation capabilities than other 
firms. The effect of capital expenditures on exploitation, however, is not significant and H4b is 
not supported. H4c predicts that firms that have increases in receivables will have stronger 
exploitation capabilities than other firms. In support of H4c, the current year impact of CHGREC 
(β = .03, p < .05) has a significant positive effect on exploitation capability. The cumulative 
impact of prior period exploitation capability demonstrates a strong positive impact on current 
year exploitation (β = .46, p < .01). Of the two control variables, firm size has a significant 
positive impact on a firm’s exploitation capabilities (β = .014, p < .01). The results for the 
exploitation capability model in the ROA column are substantially the same as for Tobin’s q. 
H5a predicts that firms that make investments in research and development will have 
superior exploration capabilities than other firms. The middle portion of Table 8 shows the 
effects of firm investments on exploration capability. Under the Tobin’s q column, the current 
year impact of R&D (β = .007, p < .05) has a significant positive effect on exploitation 
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capability. H5a is therefore supported. H5b predicts that firms that make investments in external 
arrangements will have superior exploration capabilities than other firms. The current year 
impact of JVMA (β = -.007, p < .01) has a significant negative effect on exploitation capability 
and H5b is not supported. The cumulative impact of prior period exploration capability has a 
positive impact on current year exploration (β = .915, p < .01). Of the two control variables, firm 
size has a significant positive impact on a firm’s exploration capabilities (β = .003, p < .05). 
Similar to the exploitation models, the results for the exploration capability model in the ROA 
column are substantially the same as for Tobin’s q. 
3.3 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The goals of this paper are three-fold: (1) to better understand how firms maintain exploitation 
and exploration capabilities over time; (2) to dynamically link exploitation and exploration 
capabilities to performance; and (3) to examine the potential complementary effects of 
exploitation and exploration capabilities on performance. I discuss each of these issues in turn 
below. 
I proposed that firms that make the appropriate investments can enhance their 
exploitation and exploration capabilities. Partial support was found for these hypotheses. For 
exploitation, the current year spending in terms of investments such as selling, general and 
administrative or capital expenditures seemingly had no effect. However, the cumulative effect 
of exploitation capabilities in prior periods was significant. It is plausible that certain longer-term 
customer loyalty effects are in place (Morgan and Hunt 1994), driven by firm actions in prior 
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periods. Pharmaceutical firms may not have to spend as much to maintain existing physician 
relationships. Furthermore, patients may be on a longer-term medication program and a not 
affected by changes in these expenditures. An alternative explanation for the SGA results is that 
the customers of the pharmaceutical industry are saturated with sales representatives, marketing 
promotions and advertising, in effect tuning out these efforts by the firm. SGA, under the 
resource-based view of the firm, is potentially a valuable but not a rare resource and therefore 
not a source of competitive advantage.  
Regarding exploration, current year investments in research and development have a 
positive effect on a firm’s capability. This highlights the value of ongoing investments in a 
research-intensive industry. Note that exploration had a positive impact on future firm value but 
a non-significant effect on ROA in this study. Managers should not cut R&D efforts in the face 
of short-term efforts to make earnings goals. Interestingly, a firm’s external efforts in terms of 
alliances, joint ventures, etc. had a negative effect on end of period exploration capabilities. At 
first glance, this may seem counterintuitive. Investments made during the year in these types of 
agreements, however, can cause distraction for all parties, thus resulting in a negative impact on 
capability levels. The internal focus during the mergers and acquisitions process, for example, 
can cause negative interactions for customers (Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland 1991), thus hindering 
capability growth. 
The second goal of this paper was to see if firms can gain performance advantages by 
maintaining stronger capabilities in either exploitation or exploration as compared to their 
competitors. The use of forward-looking as well as historical performance measures permitted a 
comparison of the results. First, a firm’s exploitation capability negatively affected Tobin’s q. 
However, it positively affected ROA. This is an interesting finding. Management focus appears 
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to be on improving historical measures while investors reward future value. Some degree of 
exploitation by firms is necessary to allow for reinvestment in the firm. Yet, this study shows 
that in research-focused industries such as pharmaceuticals, managers need to understand the 
tipping point at which the market will no longer value a firm’s capability in exploitation. These 
effects may apply to similarly research-intensive industries such as medical products, software, 
defense and technology. The strong positive impact of exploration on Tobin’s q but the 
insignificant effect on ROA reinforces this perspective.  
It may also be the case that incentive packages for executive management reward more 
proximate outcomes from exploitation resulting in a focus on historical over more distant 
forward-looking measures. This finding has key implications for boards of directors who are 
tasked with setting executive team compensation packages that are in line with firm strategy.  
Furthermore, analysts and investors often defined success in the pharmaceutical industry by 
strong drug pipelines. Many pharmaceutical firm web sites trumpet their firms’ progress in drug 
development. Yet, on average, the exploration capability of firms in this sample was lower than 
that of exploitation, signaling a wider industry focus on maximizing current markets. Longer 
drug development pipelines may force many pharmaceutical firms to get the most out of 
products that are currently on the market. The stakes are potentially very high. Increased market 
value allows firms more financial flexibility in terms of borrowing and investing, which can 
translate into potential resource-advantages. 
The last goal of the paper was to provide additional insight into a growing debate over 
whether or not firms achieve performance advantages by pursuing a balanced versus a focus 
strategy. In this study, the interaction of exploitation and exploration capabilities did not have a 
significant effect on either Tobin’s q or on ROA. This appears to be contradictory to prior 
  
 
83
research of a cross-sectional (e.g., Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004; He and Wong 2004; Sarkees 
and Hulland 2006) as well as a longitudinal (e.g., Kyriakopoulos and Moorman 2004) nature. 
However, the differences with the former set of studies can be attributed to methodological 
issues (survey versus objective data) as well as type of performance (historical versus forward-
looking). The latter study used subjective measures to indicate balanced exploitation and 
exploration in project performance not overall firm results. Having reconciled these differences, 
the results of this study not only fuel the debate regarding balanced versus focused strategies but 
also move the performance discussion to how exploitation and exploration affect the future 
market value of the firm. 
3.4 FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research heeds the call of scholars for a better understanding of how firms manage 
exploitation and exploration (Beckman 2006; Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006; Gupta, Smith, and 
Shalley 2006; Tushman and O’Reilly 1996). Furthermore, it addresses marketing scholars 
growing desire for a finer-grained view of historical (Chakravarthy 1986; Clark 1999) as well as 
prospective firm performance (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1999). The results set up 
potentially interesting top management discussions on capabilities and the necessary resource 
investments to support firm strategy. From this vantage point, several important areas for future 
research are now evident.  
The nature of capability growth and deterioration suggests that the overall strength of 
firm exploitation and exploration capabilities can not only change with varying degrees over 
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time but also impact the firm over differing time periods. For example, consider that in the 
pharmaceutical industry, the benefits of research and development efforts are often six to ten 
years removed from initial firm investments. These investment curves tend to be slow and 
limited at first with increasingly large expenditures near the end as human clinical trial studies 
are conducted and analyzed. Alternatively, the benefits of investments in sales force automation 
and training are more readily seen with large gains in productivity or revenues hitting the bottom 
line of firm financial statements in shorter time frame. Similarly, the rate of deterioration can 
vary across capabilities. Future research should consider the non-linear and time-lagged nature of 
accrual and deterioration of capabilities in the context of exploitation and exploration. 
The context of this study was limited to the pharmaceutical industry. It is important to 
expand future research to detailed study of other industries to understand the nuances in 
capabilities, if any, among firm types so that managerial decision making is improved. The 
medical equipment, electronics, software and some service (e.g., casinos, hotels) industries 
appear to be strong candidates for an investigation of these relationships. Potentially, the results 
form this study can be generalized to industries with similar exploitation-exploration 
characteristics. In this same context, more and more companies are branching out, if only into 
related industries or sub-industries. How do capabilities in one industry translate to another? 
Future research should examine how balancing exploitation and exploration capabilities in one 
industry translates to others.  
Other conceptualizations of the key variables in this study may provide added insight to 
the results. For example, this study did not distinguish among the types of patents granted to each 
firm. It may be worthwhile to distinguish between process and product patents in future research. 
Process patents, one may argue, is more influenced by exploration while product patents are 
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more influence by capabilities in exploitation. The global measure of external arrangements may 
also be parsed into more specific types of joint ventures, alliances, mergers and acquisitions as 
some of these agreements may be more exploitative in nature. Finally, other measures of changes 
in the customer base besides change in receivables should be examined. Perhaps another view, 
such as the change in the ratio of sales from new versus existing products or other objective 
measures would be useful extensions. 
Two control variables, firm age and firm size, were used in this study. Future research 
should examine other control variables for added insight into these relationships. For example, 
firm focus is the number of sub-markets in which a firm participates. On a broad level, 
pharmaceutical firms, if they choose, tend to participate in three main markets: pharmaceutical 
(prescription or over-the-counter drugs), consumer products (e.g., band-aids), and medical 
products/services (e.g., medical equipment). Perhaps firms focused in multiple sub-markets 
explore better than singularly focused firms. Alternatively, the multiple-market firms may not be 
strong in knowledge transfer across the units and cannot take full advantage of their capabilities. 
These relationships may play an important role in how firm capabilities are refined and deployed 
over time. Along the same lines, the therapeutic classes (e.g., antihistamines, cancer, vitamins) in 
which a pharmaceutical firm operates as well as competitive intensity with sub-markets may also 
shed light on how firms manage exploitation and exploration. 
It is also important to understand key inflection points in the growth and maintenance of 
firm exploitation and exploration capabilities. There is debate as to whether or not performance 
advantages accrue to firms that simultaneously balance exploitation and exploration capabilities 
or shift between the two (see Benner and Tushman 2003; Burgelman 2002; Christensen 1998; 
Gupta, Smith, and Shalley 2006; Levinthal and March 1993). Future research should examine if, 
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when and how these shifts in strategy from exploitation to exploration and vice versa might 
benefit the firm over the longer-term. It may be the case that simultaneously balancing 
exploitation and exploration capabilities is not the best path to enhanced longer-term 
performance but rather the shifting between the strategies is more successful. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
This study draws on longitudinal objective data to examine how firms maintain and change 
exploitation and exploration capabilities over time. It also links these capabilities to performance. 
Furthermore, it draws a comparison between the effects of capabilities on historical and forward-
looking performance measures, noting the positive effects of exploration on Tobin’s q. The 
results fan the flames of the ongoing debate between balanced versus focused strategies. From a 
marketing perspective, these insights provide much-needed direction on the future performance 
impact of strategic decisions with respect to these two capabilities. What is needed now is a more 
detailed examination of the differential time impact of investments in exploitation and 
exploration so that managers can better understand when to make resource contributions. 
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4.0  SECTION IV: ESSAY III: CUSTOMER DIVESTMENT: ISSUES, ACTIONS, AND 
REACTIONS 
A mid-western grocery store chain stopped advertising in local newspapers and embarked on a 
campaign to actively eliminate all but its most loyal customers after noting that occasional 
customers actually cost the company money (Kirsner 1999). A major financial services firm 
eliminated 33% of its customer loan portfolio due to a lack of profitability, saving an estimated 
$1 billion (Tully 2002). Why are these firms divesting customers? Given the almost fanatical 
focus of practice (Peppers and Rogers 1993) and research (e.g., Johnson and Selnes 2004; 
Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1999) on building and maintaining customer relationships, is 
divesting prudent? On the surface, it may seem like an ill-advised strategy. Yet, recent research 
notes that most customers of a company contribute little or nothing to bottom line profits (Rust, 
Lemon, and Zeithaml 2004). Furthermore, the value of a business is closely linked to the quality 
of its customer base (Kim, Mahajan and Srivastava 1995).  
Customer divestment is defined as the firm-initiated termination of an existing customer 
relationship (Mittal, Sarkees, and Murshed 2007). It is fundamentally different from customer 
switching (e.g., Keaveney 1995) or customer defection (e.g., Jones, Mothersbaugh, and Beatty 
2000) that are customer-initiated relationship terminations. Ideally, customer divestment should 
not be indiscriminant but rather the result of a comprehensive process that enhances firm value.  
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The concept of company-customer relationships is central to the discussion of divestment 
(e.g. Stern et al. 1998; Peppers and Rogers 1993). Individuals have a natural desire to be a part of 
relationships (Baumeister and Leary 1995). Company-customer relationships are, in many ways, 
extensions of interpersonal ones. Interpersonal relationships are built on interdependence and 
mutual benefit (Hinde 1979; Van Lange et al. 1997). Customers place similar value on their 
relationship with the company (e.g., Garbarino and Johnson 1999; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Price 
and Arnould 1999). As in interpersonal relationships, the dissolution of a valued relationship can 
be traumatic and perceived as a betrayal (Finkel et al. 2002), which may encourage customers to 
place blame (e.g., Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) or to “get even” (Blodgett, Hill, and Tax 1997; 
Richins 1983). It is the potential for negative customer reactions to divestment that can cause 
concern for managers and have economic ramifications for the company.  
Given the dynamics of company-customer interactions and the strong focus on customer 
relationship management, customer divestment should be at the forefront of management 
practice and research. However, many managers appear to cling, at least publicly, to an 
unusually strong dedication to retaining customer relationships. Furthermore, academic research 
to support managerial practice on divestment is virtually non-existent (see Haenlein, Kaplan and 
Schoder 2006 for a notable exception). A failure to properly understand divestment can engender 
negative outcomes such as unfavorable publicity (“Sisters Banned by Bargain Chain” 2003), 
customer retaliation (Gallagher and Kennedy 1997), and negative word of mouth (Gitomer 
2003). For large firms, the failure to divest customers has the potential for a negative impact that 
could run into the tens, if not hundreds of millions of dollars each year in lost productivity, lost 
revenue opportunities, and employee turnover. For small firms, maintaining relationships with 
customers that should be divested can be devastating for the sustainability of the business. 
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Although several researchers have called for additional study (Lehmann 1999; Morgan and Hunt 
1994), there is still virtually no guidance for managers on the issues, processes and costs 
associated with customer divestment.  
Overall, this research seeks to answer four questions: 1) Is divestment prevalent? 2) How 
do managers view divestment? 3) How do customers view divestment? and, 4) Are there ways 
for firms to mitigate the potential negative impact of customer divestment? Given the lack of 
theoretical and empirical research on customer divestment and its complexity, an inductive 
approach was used in this paper to build a knowledge base for subsequent study (Bonoma 1985; 
Flint, Woodruff, and Gardial 2002; Zaltman, LeMasters, and Heffring 1992). Marketing 
phenomena such as market orientation (Kohli and Jaworski 1990), marketing influence 
(Workman, Homburg, and Gruner 1998), and customer satisfaction information usage (Morgan, 
Anderson, and Mittal 2005) have all been enhanced through the use of the inductive approach.  
I employ several methods to understand the customer divestment phenomenon. First, I 
use archival data to understand the prevalence of customer divestment. Next, I explore the 
divestment concept from the perspectives of both managers and customers. Drawing on the 
collective insights of these studies and the archival data, a framework for customer divestment is 
presented. The results show that the complexity of customer divestment stretches far beyond 
mere profitability measures, touching many areas of the company and key stakeholders as well 
as customers and other interest groups. Furthermore, the underlying issue of expectations 
management in company-customer relationships is clearly evident in the minds of customers 
who experienced divestment. Finally, I begin to empirically test the key relationships using an 
experiment that begins to explore the central question: how can managers alleviate the potential 
negative outcomes on the firm from divestment? Results demonstrate that it is better for 
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managers not to provide a divestment warning as it gives customers time to reflect and take 
action against the firm, further damaging its value. Finally, an agenda for future research is 
discussed with an understanding that there are still many unanswered questions that need to be 
explored. 
4.1 UNDERSTANDING THE PREVALENCE OF DIVESTMENT 
The broad goal of this exploratory effort is to understand the prevalence of customer divestment 
across industries. To this point, there is no real sense of in what industries and how often 
customer divestment occurs. A review of divestment events from the popular press began to 
shape firm reasoning, the level of sophistication of the process and the resulting ramifications to 
both the firm and customers. Examples of the findings from the popular press are summarized in 
Appendix B.  
4.1.1 Method 
I drew on secondary data using examples from the popular press (e.g., Business Week, Wall 
Street Journal, USA Today). The period of study was 1998 through 2006. The research approach 
was purposefully broad in nature to accommodate a wide range of possibly sources of 
information. First, I performed a keyword search - using terms such as “customer divestment” or 
“firing customers” - of available academic databases that include articles, reports and other 
information from trade journals and newspapers. Business Source Premier, for example, contains 
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2,710 full text scholarly journals and business periodicals covering many different business-
related areas. The database search provided a number of examples of customer divestment. Next, 
I performed a keyword search of typical internet search pages (e.g., Yahoo, Google) using 
similar terms. This step also provided articles on customer divestment. Overlapping mentions of 
customer divestment from multiple sources served to corroborate the events (Golder and Tellis 
1993). For example, a divestment article in the Wall Street Journal was also typically printed in 
regional newspapers and business journals as well as online news sources. Overall, I collected 
approximately forty industry examples of customer divestment from the popular press.  
Customer divestment events had to meet four criteria to be included: competence, 
objectivity, reliability and corroboration (Golder and Tellis 1993; Gottschalk 1969): 
• Competence is the information source’s ability to report correct information. 
• Objectivity is the general unbiased nature of the source of the information when 
communicating the event. 
• Reliability is the trustworthiness of the source as a provider of information to the 
general public. 
• Corroboration is the ability to confirm information from other sources.  
I excluded information from unregulated sources such as internet discussion forums, 
letters to the editor found in newspapers or trade magazines and other outlets that surfaced 
during keyword searches. 
4.1.2 Fieldwork Findings 
As expected, customer (un)profitability proved to be a primary factor in divestment for both 
large and small firms. Marsh and McLennan, after its settlement with New York Attorney 
General Elliot Spitzer, for instance, did a strategic audit under the leadership of its new CEO 
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Michael G. Cherkasky. The review placed a greater emphasis on the profit from each customer, 
rather than a focus on sales volume alone. The audit revealed that thousands of clients were 
paying Marsh and McLennan less than $10,000 a year, and the firm was losing money on 
roughly 40,000 clients worldwide. Said the CEO: “the short term solution was obvious: Jettison 
clients that aren’t profitable and exit the people who support them” (Wall Street Journal, August 
29, 2005).  
Some of the most interesting examples of customer divestment came from firms that had 
miscalculated the risks associated with serving certain customer segments and had to make 
drastic changes to strategy to recover. Never was it more glaring than in the insurance industry 
given the unusual weather events in the southeastern United States over the past several years. 
For example, Allstate and Nationwide divested 95,000 and 35,000 homeowner’s insurance 
customers in Florida for fear of massive future losses (Adams 2006). Federal Express, in an 
analysis of its largest customers, identified those who were not bringing in as much revenue as 
promised during the initial contract negotiation. Some customers were asked to choose a new 
shipping carrier after refusing to negotiate a more mutually beneficial exchange despite a better 
understanding of the underlying structure (Brooks 1999).  
The popular press examples, however, went beyond profitability issues and encompassed 
a range of divestment reasons University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston (UTMB), for 
example, identified tens of thousands of patients with unpaid medical bills that should be 
divested. However, considering the social impact of divesting them, Joan Richardson, chief 
medical director, developed a detailed playbook to ration care among these patients to those who 
had severe needs (Wysocki 2003). Fidelity Investments, rather than outright divest certain 
segments, moved to educate 25,000 high-cost serial callers who had a tendency to seek out 
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customer representatives for live conversation regarding simple needs, such as a stock price 
quote (Brady 2000). These customers had to use more automated information sources or else 
Fidelity service representatives would not answer their calls.  
Customer divestment also had some unforeseen consequences for firms. First, if managed 
incorrectly, some of the firms’ actions may leave an undesirable impression on the employees. In 
settings where employees worked hard to acquire the customers, or when employees and 
customers develop commercial friendships, a sudden departure of client-friends can be traumatic 
for employees (Price and Arnould 1999). The previously mentioned Marsh and McLennan 
divestment actions caused widespread concern and subsequent defection of brokers. These 
employees felt that management made them drop customers that they had worked hard to acquire 
and keep, especially in the days after Mr. Spitzer filed his suit against the company. Frustrated 
and angry, many employees defected to competitors (Wall Street Journal, August 29, 2005). 
Second, firms must be cognizant of regulatory, voluntary, and non-profit organizations that may 
take on advocacy and oversight roles in response to customer divestment decisions. The 
divestment of hundreds of thousands of homeowners in high-risk areas has landed the insurance 
industry in the crosshairs of government agencies, legislatures and activist groups (Adams 2006).  
The analysis of secondary data demonstrates that divestment is widespread across 
industries. Furthermore, companies take different approaches and use varying reasons for 
divestment. This appears to generate varying responses from divested customers. These popular 
press examples laid the foundation for the customer framework that is developed in the next 
section. 
4.2 CUSTOMER DIVESTMENT FRAMEWORK 
First, I attempt to corroborate and expand on the insights from the review of popular press 
examples through first-hand accounts of divestment from managers. Then, I examine the 
perspectives of customers regarding divestment. From these two ends, a customer divestment 
framework emerged. Figure 3 summarizes the framework. 
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Figure 3: Essay 3, Customer Divestment Framework 
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4.2.1 Managers’ Perspectives 
Drawing on the insights from the popular press, I wanted to explore customer divestment in 
greater detail with the initiators of these events - the managers. The goal is to better 
understanding of how practicing managers view customer divestment and how it occurs in 
practice in their firms.   
4.2.1.1 Method 
I used one-on-one interviews to understand how managers view divestment. To begin, I 
developed a sample of practicing managers who are in a position to speak knowledgeably about 
the customer divestment concept both in general and in their firms. The sample was purposeful 
in nature so that a variety of industries and perspectives were included (Workman, Homburg, and 
Gruner 1998). Industry contacts were used to obtain access to those individuals. A semi-
structured interview format was used to allow for updates to the framework as more information 
was collected from the field (Morgan, Anderson, and Mittal 2005). Open-ended questions 
permitted managers to speak more freely on the topic, providing opportunities to examine issues 
previously unforeseen. On a final note, customer divestment is still very much a taboo topic. 
Some managers with whom I requested interviews did not want to speak about divestment 
despite promises of confidentiality.  
Overall, I interviewed thirty-two senior-level managers in twenty-seven companies in a 
variety of industries (Appendix C). Most managers held positions of leadership and/or ownership 
in their organizations. Furthermore, every manager interviewed had strategic decision-making 
responsibility and can authorize or make divestment decisions. In-depth interviews with 
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managers lasted an average of sixty minutes. Handwritten notes taken during the interviews were 
transcribed shortly after finishing as I promised not to tape the interviews given the nature of the 
subject matter (Workman, Homburg, and Gruner 1998).  
4.2.1.2 Reasons for Divestment 
Four categories of customer divestment reasons emerged based on common 
characteristics: 1) profitability, 2) capacity constraints, 3) change in strategy, and 4) employee 
productivity/morale. 
Profitability. Approximately two-thirds of the managers who divested customers stated 
that the profitability of the relationship was a major driver in identifying divestment targets. For 
example, car rental agencies reject customers who have damaged vehicles in the past. One 
manager with national responsibilities from a worldwide car rental agency stated, “Given the 
cost of our assets, it is an absolutely necessary function of our business…if someone is going to 
take advantage of the asset, we need to protect ourselves.” Irrational behavior, such as attempts 
to quickly gain market share can push customer lifetime value models aside as put managers in a 
position where they must divest customers. A communications executive spoke about his 
company’s market share grab in a highly competitive environment that subsequently became a 
wrenching exercise in customer divestment and internal re-organization. The potential long-term 
consequences of these actions are discovered after the fact when “land grabs” result in many 
unprofitable customers that should have never been acquired. 
Capacity constraints. Capacity constraints stem from reasons such as a lack of proper 
expertise, financial constraints, underestimating customer demand, regulatory issues, or even 
disruptive environmental forces that change the market. Partners in two accounting firms spoke 
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of their firms’ divesting “thousands” of U.S. customers due to the Sarbanes-Oxley act. Stringent 
reporting requirements necessitate that accounting firms spend extensive employee-hours each 
year to assure compliance for their larger publicly-traded clients. “We simply don’t have enough 
manpower to serve smaller privately owned clients. Not that we want to, but we have had to walk 
away from, raise fees, or just not pay enough attention to (and thereby drive them away) the 
smaller companies.”  
Changes in strategy. Changes in strategy of a firm or its rivals can sometimes lead to customer 
divestment. When a firm realizes that it is not high on customer’s priority list, it may similarly 
decide to divest. Some customers do not place their loyalty with one firm. Instead, they have 
several relationships to meet their needs (Rust et al. 2004). The firm may also find more lucrative 
options and divest the customer despite the latter’s full attention to the relationship. 
Alternatively, divestment may simply be a case of company evolution. One executive from a 
fast-growing consulting firm told us: “In the early years, I would bend over backwards to keep 
all business. If we do good work, we expect a good reference from a client. I’ll walk away (from 
a project) if I don’t see a good reference opportunity, even if the fee structure is OK. Now that 
we are a larger firm, we don’t need to bend as much as when we were smaller. We staff our 
people on the projects with the greatest (overall) rewards for our firm.” Past strategies that are 
no longer mutually beneficial are either renegotiated or divested. 
Employee productivity/morale. One third of interviewed managers identified employee 
productivity and morale as major reasons for customer divestment. Managers believe that is 
difficult for companies to be profitable when employees are spending time with customers that 
provide litter value or, even worse, actually destroy value through their actions. Eliminating 
troublesome customers can have a strong positive effect on employee morale in addition to 
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unburdening firm resources. By not divesting troublesome customers, executives risk an increase 
in employee turnover rates. This can disrupt organizational learning and add sizable costs to 
replacing lost employees. A partner from a leading national physician practice made it clear that 
rude or troublesome patients are asked to find another service provider. A senior vice president 
from a leading investment advisory services firm divested one of his largest clients for unruly 
behavior toward his staff. The staff was relieved. Eventually, the client apologized and renewed 
his relationship with the firm with a better understanding of how he should conduct himself. 
Service industries such as restaurants, airlines, retailers, and car rental agencies have similar 
policies. These troublesome customers may be profitable on an individual basis but the negative 
impact they have on employees and other customers is bad for the company in the long run. 
4.2.1.3 Path to Divestment 
The conversations with managers also allowed me to gain insight into the various paths 
that companies use leading up to divestment. From these discussions and the insights from Study 
1, I developed a path to customer divestment, which synthesizes the actions of companies into a 
process that managers can utilize in their interactions with customers.  
Most customer divestment actions stem from a series of actions: reassess, educate, 
renegotiate, migrate, reconfigure, and finally ending the customer relationship (For a full review 
see Mittal, Sarkees, and Murshed, 2007). These steps can help to reduce incompatibility in the 
relationship and to better match the value that the customer receives with that which the 
company offers. The extent of time spent in each phase can vary. In some situations, phases are 
skipped. However, many companies that engage in divestment utilize the entire approach as it 
allows for a systematic exploration of the relationship with the customer.  
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The first step in the process is to thoroughly review the relationship for opportunities that 
can be more mutually beneficial to both the customer and the firm. Current and future spending 
patterns are supplemented by a broader, non-financial assessment of the company-customer 
relationship. Second, once the customer relationship is fully understood, managers should 
educate their customers about the perceived incompatibility as well as the benefits of other 
products and services. Educational efforts are designed to: (1) manage customer expectations 
about the costs of the service; (2) increase customer understanding of how the service is 
provided; (3) increase customer participation; and (4) increase customer self-selection. Once 
both parties have a clear understanding of the relationship parameters, the firm can attempt to 
renegotiate the terms to create more mutually beneficial value. If renegotiation fails, then the 
customer can be migrated within the firm to products or services that provide a better fit for the 
customer’s needs as well as increased value to the firm. Migration can also involve third parties 
who can better serve the needs of these customers. Many companies have alliance partners who 
already perform these tasks in some capacity for the firm. The fifth phase, reconfigure, attempts 
to salvage the relationship by bundling or unbundling different combinations of products or 
services. Perhaps the customer will accept an offering that is more compatible with the resources 
required by the firm to provide that value. If systematically working through these five phases 
does not improve the relationship, the firm may have no other choice but to end the relationship.  
4.2.2 Customers’ Perspectives 
Next, I move the discussion of divestment from the managers to the customers, both divested and 
non-divested so that insights from the managers can be corroborated and refined. I have two key 
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research questions with respect to customer perspectives. What are the experiences of divested 
customers? How do customers react to divestment? Answering these two questions will allow a 
comparison of what managers believe should happen and what the customer is actually 
experiencing in practice. The popular press examples shed some light on how customers might 
react to divestment, noting generally negative feelings toward companies. However, it is 
important that the possibility of positive (or at least no) reaction is also explored. I had no 
preconceived notion as to how many divested customers I would find, how willing they would be 
to share their experiences, and what their experiences would be.  
4.2.2.1 Method 
A survey was used to collect data from customers. To develop the survey instrument, I 
conducted in-depth interviews with a small set of customers and pre-tested the survey with a 
convenience sample of twenty customers. I also spoke with marketing research experts and 
practicing managers. The survey contained scaled, free response and demographic questions. The 
first section listed thirty categories of businesses (e.g., banks, car rental agencies, hospitals, etc.). 
The definition of “customer divestment” was provided at the top of the survey. Participants were 
asked to visualize companies in these categories “firing” customers and rate each category on a 
ten-point scale with “1” as never and “10” as absolutely. Section Two asked participants to think 
back over the past two years to whether or not they had ever been “fired” by a company.17 If 
 
17 It is important to note that participants were asked to recall a divestment event over the past two years. Although 
some indicated through their descriptions of the event that divestment was recent, others did not explicitly provide a 
date. Selective memory and recall biases may have influenced participants’ ability to effectively remember 
divestment events. I could not control for all biases. However, I did provide a structured survey instrument and 
allowed participants ample time to complete it. These steps should have helped to minimize biases. Furthermore, the 
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participants answered “yes” to divestment, they were then asked to recall that experience. 
Questions included, among others, “What reason did the company give you for ending the 
relationship?”, “Did you receive advanced warning of a possible divestment?” and “How did you 
feel after learning of the divestment?” The goal of these questions was to understand the 
divestment process from the customer perspective, which would then allow a comparison with 
the insights from the previous studies. Section Three contained demographic questions.  
The data was collected via a survey of a convenience sample of adult consumers from a 
large northeastern U.S. city. Two hundred thirty-six people (52% female; 48% male) participated 
in the survey. The average age of the participants was twenty-seven and they ranged in age from 
eighteen to eighty. Follow-up interviews of a small set of respondents helped to clarify responses 
where needed. Approximately twenty-three percent of surveyed participants experienced a firm-
initiated relationship divestment in the past year.  
4.2.2.2 Customer Reaction to Divestment 
The participants in the survey consisted of both divested and non-divested customers. 
Therefore, the results are presented in two steps. First, I discuss Section One of the survey, which 
asked participants to visualize divestment actions in various categories of businesses. Then, I 
discuss Sections Two and Three of the survey that pertain only to divested customers.  
The results of the general survey of divested and non-divested customers are summarized 
in Figure 4. Overall, they demonstrate that both divested and non-divested customers understand 
that the possibility of a firm-initiated divestment exists across a range of industries. Furthermore, 
 
participants gave the name of the company that divested them. In doing so, they were theoretically recalling a 
specific event from memory. Future divestment studies should consider the effects of retrospective biases. 
as expected, the scores are generally higher for divested than non-divested customers. Large 
percentages of participants believed that it was high likely that firms would divest customers in 
industries such as credit cards, insurance, and car rental agencies. Non-divested customers were 
less inclined to believe that companies would divest.  
For both divested and non-divested customers, the scores were much lower in the utility 
industries such as electric, gas and phone as well as hospitals. Perhaps these scores reflect 
customers’ beliefs that these services are “rights” rather than relationships. Examples from the 
popular press, however, indicate that utility providers are moving forward with customer 
divestment initiatives. Deregulation has, in part, cleared a path for utility firms to engage in 
customer divestment initiatives and they are taking advantage of the opportunity to improve 
bottom line profits, customer service and shareholder value (Smith 2005).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
102
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21
34
35
43
45
47
50
57
68
58
62
61
74
26
35
37
47
60
55
43
57
64
66
66
68
83
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Hospital
Utilities Provider
Airline/Hotel
Casino
Bank
University
Car Rental Agency
Restaurant
Auto Insurer
Health Insurer
Credit Card Issuer
Membership Club
Landlord
Non-Divested Customers (n=183) Divested Customers (n=53)
 
 
Figure 4: Essay 3, Percentage of Respondents Who Believe that Companies in these Industries Are “Highly 
Likely” to Divest Customers 
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Next, I discuss the experiences of the divested customers. Approximately 22% of the 
respondents had experienced a divestment. Of those, half were male and half were female. They 
ranged in age from young adults to senior citizens. Divestment occurred across a range of firms 
such as insurance, credit cards, retailers, and rental agencies. Three general categories of 
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customer reactions to divestment emerged from the analysis: (1) taking ownership/investing 
more in the relationship; (2) negative reactions; or (3) no reaction.  
Relationship ownership/investment.  Some divested customers showed a tendency, if 
given the opportunity, to explore how the relationship could be saved. The desire to take 
ownership of the perceived problem appears to stem largely from the process the company used 
in the divestment process. For example, most managers and consumers that we interviewed 
supported advanced notification of pending divestment. A warning is one way of educating 
customers about the relationship expectations. It can allow customers to engage with the firm in 
a constructive manner to resolve differences and strengthen the relationship (Rusbult and 
Zembrodt 1983). A warning can also help to shift the responsibility to the customer to strengthen 
the relationship. In the event the relationship fails, then the customer should recognize that they 
are partially to blame. Unfortunately, of the divested customers surveyed in Study 3 two-thirds 
received no warning. Of those who were warned, forty percent took some action to rectify the 
relationship.  
Negative reactions.  The overwhelming concern of managers is for negative customer 
reactions after divestment. Research also indicates that merely ending relationships can create 
uncomfortable feelings (e.g., Bloom et al. 1978). Customers are naturally looking to attribute 
blame (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) or to “get even” (Blodgett, Hill, and Tax 1997; Richins 1983). 
It is important then to understand what factors may enhance or mitigate negative reactions to 
divestment. Three factors seemed to influence the degree of negative reaction from divested 
customers: the customers’ perceived strength of the relationship, the reason for the action, and 
the process by which the divestment was carried out.   
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Negative reactions may depend upon the customer’s perceived strength of the 
relationship with the firm. Several divested customers that were surveyed recalled a sense of 
relief, perhaps indicating that they knew it was a weak relationship with the company. However, 
it appears that negative feelings from divestment can be substantially greater for customers who 
perceived a strong relationship with the company. These divested customers felt that they had 
invested the time, money and effort to develop a relationship with the company. Feelings of 
anger, frustration and embarrassment were more common in these cases. Negative feelings can 
lead to negative behaviors to gain some revenge (e.g., Morrill and Thomas 1992; Rusbult et al. 
1991) as well as negative word of mouth to family, friends or third parties such as consumer 
interest groups (Laczniak, DeCarlo, and Ramaswami 2001; Richins 1983).  
The reasons the company provided for divestment to the customers also factored into 
negative reactions toward the firm. When recalling their experiences, divested customers gave 
reasons similar to those found in the conversations with managers: profitability, capacity 
constraints, changes in company strategy and even some instances of employee 
productivity/morale. The difference with divested customers is that they are on the receiving end 
of the reason. Customers felt differently depending upon the reason the company provided. Some 
customers felt that the reasons were not legitimate enough to warrant divestment.  
It also appears that many companies compound the complexity of a divestment through 
the haphazard divestment processes. This corroborates the findings from the managers that many 
companies lack a formal divestment process. First, the method of divestment notification can be 
an issue. Many customers received impersonal letters or even e-mails notifying them of 
divestment. Fewer divested customers received personal communications from a company 
representative. Some divested customers found out about the firm’s action only upon service 
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failure. Second, inappropriate conduct of customer service employees during the divestment 
process only exacerbates the situation. Divested customers expressed frustration with what they 
felt was their own lack of understanding of what was expected from the relationship. They 
reported rude and unsympathetic customer service personnel or no way to reach the company at 
all to talk about the divestment. This, they believed, reflected a “guilty until proven innocent” 
mindset of the company that divested them. As noted earlier, with some warning of the 
company’s dissatisfaction, perhaps these negative reactions could have been avoided. Overall, it 
appears that a more rigorous, formal process can help to mitigate negative reactions of firms. 
No action.  The results indicate that in divestment actions, the customer takes no action 
against the company approximately 80% of the time. The divested party just exits quietly 
without complaining to either the firm or to a third party. This is perplexing as more than 60% of 
the divested customers reported feelings of anger toward the firm. It would be premature, 
however, to assume that because only a minority of divested customers complains that the 
damage to firm value would be less. 
That most of the divested customers took no action against the firm despite 
overwhelming negative feelings is surprising. However, customer reactions are dependent on the 
situation, cost/benefit or pursuing negative behavior and probability of success (Day et al. 1981). 
First, other relationship options may be available to the divested customer. When customers are 
divested from service providers such as insurance, banks, credit card or utility companies they 
can apply for service from another provider. Unfortunately, the cost of changing relationships 
increases for the customer. For example, when a customer is divested from an insurance 
provider, it is very likely that another service provider will charge a higher premium to hedge 
risk. Perhaps the perceived finality of the firm’s actions deters customers from taking action. 
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Customers may feel that the firm’s decision is final and that taking action is a waste of time. 
Second, some customers have no concept of what actions they can take to help themselves. This 
is particularly evident for two demographic groups: young adult and older “baby boomers”. 
These groups can feel particularly disenfranchised in the divestment process because of a lack of 
perceived power. Although this is not discussed at length in this paper, the social ramifications of 
customer divestment for disenfranchised groups can be a pressing issue for firms. 
4.2.3 General Summary 
Customer divestment is a growing strategic option for firms across many industries. Yet, 
managers and customers are struggling with the concept of divestment, how it is carried out and 
how it affects key stakeholders. Although many interviewed managers drew on profitability as 
the main reason for divestment, other non-financial issues also factored into the decision. 
Unfortunately, more than two-thirds of the managers I interviewed stated that their companies 
did not have an established divestment process. Couple this with the fact that many of these same 
managers had divested customers and opportunities for negative impact on the company can 
increase. As negative impact on the firm is the paramount concern of managers, it was 
interesting that there was such a discrepancy in divestment processes. The path to divestment 
discussed in this section distills the various managerial practices into a more structured approach. 
The key in divestment is to help the customer to recognize that the decision (1) was reached with 
careful thought and discussion; (2) was made after taking several steps to reinforce, rebuild or 
create a more mutually beneficial exchange; and (3) is mutually beneficial as the firm is no 
longer able to meet the customer’s needs without harming itself. 
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Three overriding challenges emerged from the research with managers and customers: (1) 
managers need to build on measures of customer profitability by incorporating non-financial 
criteria into the divestment decision; (2) managers must develop the right processes to support 
divestment actions; and (3) given the sensitive nature of divestment managers must work hard to 
mitigate the potential negative effect of customer reaction on the financial health of the 
company, its employees and its brand image. Discrepancies appear to exist between how 
managers perceive the divestment process and how it is actually carried out in practice. The 
result is that customers experience the negative feelings and reactions toward the terminating 
company that managers are trying to avoid. In doing so, managers invite further problems such 
as handling customer complaints, negative word-of-mouth, public relations issues and interest 
from regulatory bodies.  
As an initial step in adding to the body of knowledge on customer divestment, I next use 
an experiment to examine how managers can mitigate negative customer reactions to divestment 
by improving the process in which it is handled. Specifically, two interesting aspects of 
divestment are investigated: (1) customer perceptions of the company’s reason behind the 
divestment and (2) customer perceptions of the manner in which the divestment is communicated 
to them. The goal is to find an appropriate divestment method so that the firm can re-direct its 
resources to more valuable relationships with limited negative impact. 
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4.3 MITIGATING NEGATIVE REACTIONS TO DIVESTMENT: AN EXPERIMENT 
4.3.1 Theory and Hypotheses 
Attribution theory posits that people use information to make causal explanations for things, 
situations or events they encounter in daily life (e.g., Folkes 1988; Mizerski et al. 1979).  
Attributions form the basis for customer attitudes, intentions and behaviors toward products, 
services, companies and their employees (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). Attitudes, intentions and 
behaviors can be different depending upon how the explanation is assessed (Weiner 1992). 
Marketing researchers have used attribution theory to explain a variety of consumer behaviors 
such as purchasing, product failure, and source credibility (see Folkes 1988, for a full review) as 
well as customer satisfaction (Tsiros, Mittal, and Ross 2004). Its universal concern for 
explanation makes attribution theory provides a good foundation for understanding how 
customers react to divestment. As was noted in the first three studies in this paper, the dissolution 
of a company-customer relationship is similar to an interpersonal one, creating potentially strong 
emotional reactions and a desire to seek explanations. 
Divested customers are motivated to protect their self esteem as they often feel 
embarrassed or angry (Folkes 1988). In fact, customers may go to great extent avoid negative 
self feelings (Weiner et al. 1987). Given this tendency, attribution theory predicts that divested 
customers are looking for information that mitigates their culpability and shifts the locus of 
blame to the company or some other party (Weiner 1986). For example, Folkes (1984) finds that 
if customers associated a product failure with the company, then they expect refunds and 
apologies from the company. However, that same study found that customers do not expect these 
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outcomes when they are the ones who cause the product to failure (e.g., breakage). Customers 
may then feel that their failure is deserved (Feather 1992). In a similar manner, this suggests that 
negative reactions to divestment may be contingent on the perceived reason for the divestment 
(Bettman 1979; Folkes 1988). The reason is a way to reduce the customer’s feeling of failure, 
guilt or embarrassment about the dissolution relationship. 
The insights of from the archival data and the customer surveys in this paper provide the 
initial support that customer reactions to divestment are driven in part by the reason given by the 
company. Attribution theory suggests that the reasons take two forms: internal (controllable) and 
external (uncontrollable). Prior research in consumer behavior also suggests that customers draw 
inferences about the company’s motives for its actions (e.g., Friestad and Wright 1994). If firms 
are perceived to be acting in a self-serving manner, then customers will have more unfavorable 
evaluations of the company (e.g., Campbell and Kirmani 2000). This logic lends support to the 
importance of how customers view internal versus external reasons as a driver of attitudes 
toward a divesting company. If the firm has an internally-oriented reason for divestment, such as 
profitability or a change in business strategy, it may be perceived as self-serving by the 
customers. These reasons are sourced from within the company and thus are the controllable 
(Bitner 1990; Weiner 2000). Perhaps, then, a divested customer can get the decision reversed and 
re-establish a more beneficial relationship with the company. Alternatively, external divestment 
reasons such as natural disasters and changes in government regulations are not under the control 
of the company. In these cases, divested customers are more likely to accept these reasons from 
the company, attributing the event rather to some other factor than themselves (e.g., Bloom et al. 
1978; Weiner 2000). For example, Weiner (1986; 2000) suggests that difference between angry 
and sympathy toward the company is driven by whether or not customers perceive a service 
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failure as controllable (e.g., poor service) versus uncontrollable (e.g., weather delay). 
Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed:  
H1.  Attitudes of divested customers will be more positive 
when they make attribute the firm’s reason for divestment to an 
external factor rather than an internal factor. 
 
Managers also know that divested customers may react in a negative manner to the notice 
of divestment. However, the absence of a warning can hurt the company in several ways. First, 
there is no real opportunity for the customer to address the issues surrounding the divestment 
with company. The result may be angry customers who subsequently take up more time from 
employees through calls to customer service or store visits, thus hinder productivity and possibly 
putting the company’s actions on public display. Second, the absence of a divestment warning 
means that there is no transition time available for the customer to migrate to a new relationship. 
Third, blindsiding a customer with a divestment action increases the changes of retaliatory 
actions by the customer (e.g., Laczniak, DeCarlo, and Ramaswami 2001; Richins 1983; Rusbult 
et al. 1991). The customer may feel a sense of embarrassment or a loss of self-esteem from the 
divestment. The firm may incur negative short or long-term brand image impairment, depending 
upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the divestment.  
What can managers do to mitigate, or perhaps eliminate negative reactions by customers 
who are terminated? Prior studies (e.g., Weiner 1974) show that people reward extra effort 
despite a negative event. Furthermore, customers demonstrate a willingness to reward companies 
who display extra effort, particularly when they feel it is personal in nature (Morales 2005). 
Companies can issue a warning notification that the relationship might be terminated in the near 
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future. This is a clear indicator to the customer that there is a problem with the relationship. A 
warning allows a customer either to address the issues or exit the relationship. It also shifts some 
control over the outcome to the customer. By doing so, the customer becomes partially to blame 
for the relationship divestment. If the relationship does not improve, the company has at least 
provided the opportunity for the customer to create a stronger relationship. 
The warning has given the customer an opportunity to improve the relationship. When 
the divestment occurs, an external reason shifts the blame for the event to some outside force. 
The customer feels that an opportunity was given to them and in the end it was not their fault for 
the divestment. For example, divested homeowners insurance customers were told that the risk 
of natural disaster created the problem in the relationship. Therefore, the customer should have a 
much lower propensity to direct negative attitudes toward the company. However, customers 
who receive an internal reason with the divestment warning may be put off. Reasons such as 
profitability or a change in business strategy may be simply perceived as an excuse rather than a 
tangible, believable event that the customer can understand. Used in combination then, the 
benefits of a warning and an external reason for divestment may help to mitigate divested 
customers reactions. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H2.  Attitudes of divested customers toward the firm will be 
more positive when a prior warning is received with an external 
reason for the action than in other conditions.   
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4.3.2 Method 
Subjects and Design.  One hundred twenty-one undergraduate students from business courses at 
a large university participated. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (reasons 
provided by the company for divestment – internal or external) X 2 (divestment warning – yes or 
no) between-subjects experimental design. 
Procedure and Stimuli. Participants were provided with a scenario and were asked to 
imagine themselves as five-year customers of a fictitious bank, named Diversified bank. They 
were given some background on their relationship with Diversified bank. Participants were 
informed that, as customers, they visited a Diversified bank branch about once every three 
months and routinely used the ATM machines to withdraw money or make deposits. They had a 
checking account with an average monthly balance of $2,500 and had availed themselves of 
other bank services, such as certificates of deposit and savings bonds.  
Next, participants were presented with an interim event, which was a notification of their 
respective status with the bank. In the “divestment warning” scenario, participants were informed 
by the bank that they needed to improve the relationship. The “no warning” scenario did not 
provide any indication from the bank that the relationship might be in jeopardy. Customers were 
then notified of the company-initiated divestment and the reason as either internal, a “change in 
business strategy,” or external, a “persistent economic downturn” affecting the bank (See 
Appendix D for a full description of each scenario).  
After reading the scenario, participants responded to a set of questions that measured the 
dependent variable, their attitude toward the divesting company. Manipulation checks and 
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demographic questions were also included (e.g. gender, age). Prior to debriefing and dismissal, 
participants were asked to guess the purpose of the study to assess any demand artifacts. 
4.3.3 Measures 
Attitudes.  The dependent variable, attitude toward the company, was measured by three 
questions adapted from Allen and Janiszewski (1989) that are widely used to measure customer 
attitudes. The average of the three items forms an index of customer attitudes (α = .92). Each 
item is measured on a 10-point Likert scale. Only the anchor scales are shown below: 
• My view of this company is…extremely unfavorable/extremely favorable 
• My feelings toward this company are…extremely negative/extremely positive. 
• The company is...not at all good/extremely good.  
4.3.4 Manipulation Checks 
Divestment Reason.  The manipulation check for divestment reason was measured by one item, 
using a 10-point Likert scale with 1 = “no control” and 10 = “extreme control” as the anchor 
points. Participants indicated how much “control they felt the bank had over the divestment 
decision.” A t-test showed that the manipulation was successful as the mean for the internal 
reason condition was higher than the mean for the external reason condition (M = 4.85 vs. M = 
4.25, p < .05).  
Divestment Warning.  The manipulation check for divestment warning was measured by 
one item, using a 10-point Likert scale with 1 = “not at all aware” and 10 = “extremely aware” as 
the anchor points. Participants indicated how “aware they were prior to actual notification that 
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Diversified bank might end its relationship.” A t-test showed that the manipulation was 
successful as the mean for the warning was higher than the mean for the no warning condition 
(M = 4.15 vs. M = 3.24, p < .01).  
The correlation between the manipulation checks was statistically non-significant (r = 
.03, p = .73), indicating that the manipulations are orthogonal. 
4.3.5 Results 
Attitudes.  A 2 X 2 ANOVA of the dependent variable, attitude toward the divesting company, 
was used to test the overall model for the between-subjects design. The independent variables, 
external versus internal divestment reasons and warning versus no warning, are coded with 
contrasting dummy variables (1, -1). Results are presented in Table 9. The main effect of 
divestment reason was significant (β = .33, p < .05), indicating that external reasons for 
divestment have a positive effect on attitude toward the company. Therefore, H1 is supported. 
The main effect of providing a divestment warning was marginally significant but negative (β = -
.23, p < .10). More importantly, the two-way interaction of divestment reason X divestment 
warning was significant but negative (β = -.28, p<.05). Therefore, H2 is not supported. 
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Table 9: Essay 3, Experiment Results  
 
 
Dependent Variable: Attitudes 
  
Hypotheses 
(Outcome) 
  
Coefficients 
(t-values) 
Main Effects   
Reason H1 
Supported 
 .33* 
(2.58) 
Warning  -.23() 
(-1.84) 
   
Two-Way Interaction Effect   
Reasons X Warning H2 
Not supported 
-.28* 
(-2.16) 
 
** p < .01; * p < .05; () p < .10 
 
 
 
The pattern of means within each cell of the divestment warning condition confirms the 
moderating effect. For who did not receive a divestment warning, the mean attitude toward the 
company was higher for external than internal reasons (Mexternal = 3.38, Minternal = 2.17; t = 3.31, 
p < .01). For subjects who received a divestment warning, there was no significant difference in 
the attitudes toward the company due to reasons provided (Mexternal = 2.36, Minternal = 2.25; n.s.). 
The cell means are depicted in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5: Essay 3, Customer Attitudes toward the Company 
 
 
4.3.6 Discussion 
  
 
117
It was proposed that firms that cite an externally-oriented reason for divestment can mitigate 
negative attitudes toward the company. Drawing on self-protection mechanisms, customers may 
more readily accept that the divestment is not due to something they did but rather to an issue 
that is outside of the firm’s control. A large-scale public event, such as a hurricane along the 
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Florida coast or a widespread economic downturn, is readily apparent to customers and thus 
divestment reasons linked to these events may be more believable. Managers may take advantage 
of certain environmental events as a reason to rationalize the customer base if appropriate. 
External reasons should, however, be linked to the company-customer relationship. For example, 
a company whose business has little to do with the gulf coast of Florida but uses a hurricane as a 
reason to divest customers may find little sympathy with the public. For example, several 
insurers are using hurricanes in the southeastern U.S. as a reason to divest customers in the 
northeastern U.S. where there is very limited potential for such an event. Here, the public seems 
to “see through” the external reason and judge it as more of an internal profitability-oriented one. 
Finally, regardless of the perceived link, managers should be cautious of using external reasons 
too often as the company may gain a public reputation for divesting customers. 
The main effect of providing a warning prior to divestment provided partial support for a 
more negative attitude toward the company. It is possible that providing customers with time to 
fight the company’s decision or get involved in other negative behaviors. Yet, divested 
customers also want to know why they were divested. The significant interaction between a 
warning and an external reason for divestment provides insight into this relationship. The results 
show a surprising increase in negative attitudes toward the company. The time delay between the 
warning and divestment, coupled with the reason, may engender negative attitudes toward the 
company. This speaks to how customers perceive the similarity of interpersonal and company-
customer relationships. Prior research demonstrates that the dissolution of a valued relationship 
can be traumatic and perceived as a betrayal (Finkel et al. 2002), which may encourage 
individuals to place blame (e.g., Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) or to “get even” (Blodgett, Hill, and 
Tax 1997; Richins 1983). Managers need to take the perspective of the customer in the path to 
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divestment and understand that certain emotional responses may occur. A structured process that 
educates employees on how to deal with negative responses may go a long way to mitigating the 
effects of divestment on companies. Furthermore, employees may be less likely to “feel badly” 
about divesting customers if a structured process is in place to protect them and allow them to 
productively function in their positions at the company. Moreover, proper education of the 
customer as to the expectations of the company can also help to limit negative outcomes. 
Finally, while the manipulation checks are statistically significant, the absolute difference 
between the manipulated versus the control group is small. Thus, the strength of the 
manipulations may be weaker than anticipated.  This may be another reason why H2 was not 
significant. The work of Aaker, Fournier and Brasel (2004) is a potential relevant solution here 
for longitudinal experimentation to strengthen the manipulations.  
4.4 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Prior to this research, a conceptual and empirical understanding of the complex nature of 
customer divestment was virtually non-existent in the marketing literature. This research is a first 
step in exploring the customer divestment phenomenon. Secondary data was collected and 
analyzed that provided a clearer picture of the prevalence of customer divestment. Insights from 
managers whose companies engage in divestment provided a foundation for the study of 
important issues. Customers gave first hand accounts of their divestment experiences. The result 
is a framework from which future customer divestment research can be built. To the best of my 
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knowledge, this paper also represents the first steps in empirically testing key relationships in the 
customer divestment phenomenon.  
The results from the experiment provide a glimpse of the complexity of customer 
divestment. Perhaps most surprising is that it appears from the experiment that firms should not 
provide advanced warning prior to customer divestment actions. However, more work is needed 
on the part of managers to standardize customer divestment processes and procedures. 
Continuing work on what role do expectations, attributions, commitment and trust play in 
determining consumer reactions (e.g., perceptions of fairness) to divestment is needed. What 
mediating variables come into play during the divestment process? Finally, what are the 
economic ramifications for the company of negative behaviors from divestment? Those who 
receive negative word of mouth communications regarding a product or service from friends are 
more influenced in their evaluations than by commercially provided data such as that found in 
Consumer Reports (Herr et al. 1991). These negative attitudes and intentions take a long period 
of time to attenuate (Dholakia and Morwitz 2002), increasing the possibility of continued 
retaliatory actions against the company. 
The exploratory nature of this research has also provided fodder for several lines of 
research within this stream. Several key questions stand out as critical to framing the future 
discussion of customer divestment. First, how do managers change the traditional thinking that 
every customer should be retained? There appears to be little broad thinking on the topic. At its 
best, customer divestment can be a key strategic initiative that allows firms to better utilize its 
resources, positively impacting the firm, its profits and its employees. Although we found a 
number of instances where managers engaged in divestment, there was no systematic process 
across or within industries or across relationship situations (e.g., business-to-consumer or 
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business-to-business). Furthermore, the methods used to carry out divestment actions are 
haphazard at best. Similarly, research to date is largely unequivocal in its disregard for the idea 
that large segments of customers in a given firm should be divested. As noted previously, 
customer lifetime value models virtually ignore the benefits and costs of customer divestment. 
Finally, it was surprising to find that consumers have considered the possibility that firms may 
divest them as customers. However, there were discrepancies in what consumers might call 
“critical need” categories such as utility providers and hospitals. Here I noted instances where 
firms in these industries are moving to divest certain customers. It suggests the potential for 
heterogeneity of customer reaction to divestment depending on the industry in which it occurs. It 
also underscores a broader social and public policy issue of customer divestment decisions. What 
are the short- and long-term impacts of divestment on certain customer segments such as the 
elderly or the working poor? Similarly, there is the potential for regulatory involvement based on 
a perceived habit of divestment within certain industries. Should government get involved in 
these actions? Is divestment a matter of mutual benefit between two parties and therefore no 
business of government? This research stream is rife with social, legal and ethical issues that 
need attention from researchers.  
Another issue centers around the impact of divestment on retained customers. Are these 
groups affected in a negative or positive way by the divestment of other customers who had 
relationships with the same company? Along the same line, how do divestment decisions affect 
the ability to conduct customer-based experiments, and get customer feedback? Future research 
should seek to understand how these transgressions, if perceived as such, affect current 
customers. Perhaps the retained customers, who are theoretically more valued by companies, will 
appreciate the renewed focus and resources on their needs going forward. 
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Customer divestment has monetary and non-monetary effects on companies. Teasing out 
the short- and long-term effects on the company from customer divestment is important for 
strategic decision making. Furthermore, an understanding of the impact of competitor reactions 
to divestment is necessary. How should competitors react, if at all, to a divested customer? The 
popular press sources noted that some competitors are more than willing to accommodate 
divested customers. If this is the case, does it make business sense to take on a customer 
relationship that was cast off by another company? A large scale divestment from a merger or 
acquisition, for example, may entice competitors into relationships with these customers. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
Marketing researchers note that there is still much to learn about how customers judge the 
fairness of a firm’s actions (Boulding et al. 2005). Customer divestment is another action that 
will be debated and discussed. However, customer divestment is unique in that it signals a final 
act in the relationship between a company and a customer. Therefore, it is expected that 
customer divestment has the potential to be more heatedly debated than say, a bad customer 
service interaction. It becomes imperative that both managers and customers understand the 
parameters of their relationships. Further, it is evident that much work needs to be done by 
managers to communicate the expectations of the firm to customers. Academic researchers 
should take up this topic and build a greater understanding of customer divestment. 
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5.0  SECTION V:   CONCLUSION 
My dissertation examines in three essays how firms utilize exploitation and exploration 
strategies, independently and in combination, for competitive advantage. In this set of research, I 
made five contributions to the literature. The first contribution is an understanding of how 
functional implementation helps or hinders a firm that balances exploitation and exploration to 
enhance performance relationship. The first essay shows that several dimensions of performance 
in an ambidextrous strategy are increased through successful implementation at the marketing 
function level. This reconfirms the critical role that functional units play as translators and 
implementers of firm strategy (Bonoma 1984; Bourgeois and Brodwin 1984; Hambrick 1983; 
Nutt 1987), but does so for the first time in the context of organizational ambidexterity. 
Interestingly, there is not a mediating effect for functional implementation in the relationship 
between ambidextrous firm strategy and revenue. In this regard, the first essay demonstrates the 
marketing function’s contribution to the success of an ambidextrous strategy would be 
overlooked, to the firm’s detriment, if revenue was the sole focus of managers. Strong support 
for the mediating effect of functional implementation was also observed for manufacturing but 
not service firms.  
The second contribution is to expand the understanding of the financial impact of 
exploitation and exploration on the firm. In the first essay, the results show that a balanced 
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exploitation-exploration strategy has a positive effect on various dimensions of performance 
such as revenue, profitability, customer satisfaction, and new product introductions. Much of the 
prior research linked a balanced strategy only to revenue improvements. The first essay shows 
that focusing too much on a single metric (such as revenue) may inadvertently lead the firm to 
shift its balance of emphasis from an ambidextrous strategy to exploration or – more likely – 
exploitation. The second essay goes a step further to examine the differential impact of 
exploitation and exploration on historical (e.g., ROA) versus forward-looking (e.g., Tobin’s q) 
performance. The results of the second essay show that a firm’s exploitation capability 
negatively affected Tobin’s q. However, it positively affected ROA. This is an interesting 
finding. Management focus appears to be on improving historical measures while investors are 
interested in future value. The strong positive impact of exploration on Tobin’s q but the 
insignificant effect on ROA reinforces this perspective. This outcome has key implications for 
boards of directors who are tasked with setting executive team compensation packages that are in 
line with firm strategy. Increasing market value allows firms more financial flexibility in terms 
of borrowing and investing, which can translate into potential resource-advantages. Finally, I 
provide additional insight in essay two into a growing debate over whether or not firms achieve 
performance advantages by pursuing a balanced versus a focus strategy. In this study, the 
interaction of exploitation and exploration capabilities did not have a significant effect on either 
Tobin’s q or on ROA.  
The third contribution is a better understanding of the time dependent nature effects of 
managing both exploitation and exploration. The second essay takes a longitudinal approach to 
this issue, finding partial support that firms can enhance their exploitation and exploration 
capabilities by making the appropriate investments. In particular, the cumulative effect of 
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exploitation and exploration capabilities in prior periods significantly and positively affects the 
current year capabilities. Notably, firms must make continuing investments in research and 
development to maintain strong exploration capabilities. Exploration also has a positive impact 
on future firm value but a non-significant effect on ROA in this study. This signals that managers 
should not cut R&D efforts in the face of short-term efforts to make earnings goals.  
Finally, given the difficulty of managing exploitation and exploration, the importance of 
keeping the firm on track becomes paramount. The third essay begins to get at this issue by 
examining how firms can divest customers so that capabilities can be focused on enhancing other 
market opportunities. Customer divestment is the firm-initiated termination of relationship with 
an existing customer. Using archival data, I find many examples across industries of customer 
divestment. An examination of the divestment concept with managers and customers reveals a 
broad customer divestment framework that can be applied in future research. Finally, an 
experiment begins to test empirically how managers can mitigate the potential negative outcomes 
from divestment. The results of the experiment demonstrate that it is better for managers not to 
provide a divestment warning as it gives customers time to reflect and take action against the 
firm. Collectively, these studies create a foundation for future research in an area that has a direct 
effect on how firms allocate investments and maintain capabilities. 
There are still many interesting issues and relationships to be examined in the 
exploitation-exploration literature. An important next step in this research stream is to tease out 
the differential impact of capabilities on the firm. The nature of capability growth and 
deterioration suggests that the overall strength of firm exploitation and exploration capabilities 
can not only change with varying degrees over time but also impact the firm over differing time 
periods. For example, consider that in the pharmaceutical industry, the benefits of research and 
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development efforts are often six to ten years removed from initial firm investments. These 
investment curves tend to be slow and limited at first with increasingly large expenditures near 
the end as human clinical trial studies are conducted and analyzed. Alternatively, the benefits of 
investments in sales force automation and training are more readily seen with large gains in 
productivity or revenues hitting the bottom line of firm financial statements in shorter time 
frame. Similarly, the rate of deterioration can vary across capabilities. Future research should 
consider the non-linear and time-lagged nature of accrual and deterioration of capabilities in the 
context of exploitation and exploration. 
It is also important going forward to understand key inflection points in the growth and 
maintenance of firm exploitation and exploration capabilities. There is debate as to whether or 
not performance advantages accrue to firms that simultaneously balance exploitation and 
exploration capabilities or shift between the two (see Benner and Tushman 2003; Burgelman 
2002; Christensen 1998; Gupta, Smith, and Shalley 2006; Levinthal and March 1993). Future 
research should examine if, when and how these shifts in strategy from exploitation to 
exploration and vice versa might benefit the firm over the longer-term. It may be the case that 
simultaneously balancing exploitation and exploration capabilities is not the best path to 
enhanced longer-term performance but rather the shifting between the strategies. 
My dissertation builds on the existing base of exploitation-exploration knowledge in 
many ways and gives managers practical insights for use in their firms. I believe that continuing 
to move the discussion into marketing-related topics will have cross-functional benefits for the 
firm. Finally, the complexities of how resources and capabilities impact exploitation and 
exploration provide many fruitful areas for future research. 
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6.0  SECTION VI: APPENDICES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 
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APPENDIX A:  ESSAY 1, INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT MEASURES 
Ambidextrous Firm Strategy* 
Construct Items 
Firm Exploitation The functional areas of this organization work coherently to support the overall objectives of 
this organization. 
This organization uses its resources effectively. 
Management provides clear goals and objectives for the functional units. 
 
Firm Exploration We are encouraged to challenge outdated traditions and practices. 
This organization is flexible enough to allow us to respond quickly to changes in our markets. 
This organization evolves rapidly in response to shifts in our business priorities. 
 
*Items are adapted from Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004). 
Marketing Implementation** 
Construct Items 
Marketing 
Exploitation 
We are very efficient. 
We work together to support the overall objectives of the marketing function. 
We work well with other functional units in this organization. 
We apply knowledge from other functional units to better serve our customers. 
 
Marketing 
Exploration 
We interact regularly with customers in emerging market segments. 
We focus on developing new product/services for our customers. 
We have a broad range of products/services. 
We have extensive customer services capabilities. 
 
**Items are adapted from Menon et al. (1999) and self-developed for this study. 
Subjective Business Performance Measures 
Construct Items 
Revenue Our firm’s revenue was higher last year than our major competitors. 
Profit Our profit was higher than our major competitors. 
Customer 
Satisfaction 
Customer satisfaction levels were higher than our major competitors. 
New Product 
Introductions 
We introduced more new products/services into the market than our competitors. 
Note: Items are scored on a seven-point Likert scale with 1=strongly disagree and 7=strongly agree as the anchors. Respondents were asked to 
indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with the following statements. 
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APPENDIX B: ESSAY 3, FACTUAL REPORTS OF CUSTOMER DIVESTMENT 
 
 
Company 
 
Article Title, Author, Journal 
 
Short Description 
Marsh and 
McLennan 
“After Spitzer Probe, Marsh and 
McLennan CEO tries Corporate Triage” 
August 29, 2005, Wall St. Journal, by 
Ian McDonald. 
In response to scandals and SEC investigations, CEO Cherkasky 
“called a meeting of top executives and asked for a breakdown of 
profits, client by client. He recalls being greeted with awkward 
silence. Marsh didn’t keep track of how much money it made from 
which customers.” He gave subsidiary Kroll 48 hours to crunch 
the numbers. The firm was losing on about 40,000 clients or 25% 
of its base. These clients and the employees that supported them 
were immediately let go, irritating employees. 
TXU “How a Texas Power Company Got 
Tough with Customers” 
March 22, 2005, Wall St. Journal, by 
Rebecca Smith. 
CEO John Wilder has capitalized on electricity deregulation, 
“disconnecting late-paying customers while offering special perks 
to those who pay on time.” A combination of tactics reduced bad 
debt by $26MM in 2004. Also, competitors were raiding TXU’s 
home territory but escalating costs elsewhere made them less 
competitive. “Soon managers were coming to meetings…showing 
what the company had previously ignored: which consumers were 
profitable and which were not. TXU has gotten in trouble for some 
of its aggressive tactics. Some of its customers must migrate to 
pre-paid electricity providers. TXU has started a customer loyalty 
program. 
 
EchoStar 
 
DirecTV 
“Echostar Launches Prepaid Service for 
Customers with Weak Credit” 
February 17, 2006, Wall St. Journal, by 
Andy Pasztor. 
Launched pre-paid satellite television for consumers who can’t 
meet the company’s credit guidelines. Customers pay cash up 
front for equipment and then purchase a prepaid card to get access 
to Echostar programming on a monthly basis. The cards seek to 
eliminate financial liability from unpaid bills. Rival DirecTV has 
asked similar risky customers to put up $200 to $300 deposit – but 
no prepaid cards. 
First Union 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PageNet 
 
 
 
 
FedEx 
 
 
“Unequal Treatment: Alienating 
Customers Isn’t Always a Bad Idea…” 
January 7, 1999, Wall St. Journal, by 
Rick Brooks. 
First Union uses a program that ranks each customer using a 
formula that includes minimum balances, account activity, branch 
visits and other variables. Customer accounts get either a green, 
yellow or red flag which helps dictate service levels. “Everyone 
isn’t the same anymore,” says Steven Boehm, general manager of 
First Union’s customer-information center. First Union estimates 
that this system will add $100 million in annual revenue. 
 
PageNet sent letters to marginal paging-services customers telling 
them of higher fees. “There’s just no free lunch anymore,” said a 
PageNet spokesman “We’ve done the research now to feel 
comfortable walking away with no regrets.” 
 
FedEx did an analysis of 30 large customers that generate 10% of 
its total volume and found that certain customers weren’t bringing 
in as much revenue as they had promised when deals were 
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First Chicago 
negotiated. A couple of customers who refused rate increases were 
told to take their business elsewhere. 
 
“When First Chicago, now part of Bank One, imposed a $3 teller 
fee in 1995 on some of its money-losing customers, 30,000 of 
them – or 3% of the bank’s total customers – closed their 
accounts. Some competitors, such as Raymond James Trust Co. 
and Sound Trust Co. are servicing these divested customers. 
 
U.S. Veterans 
Administration 
Medical Center 
in Portland, OR 
“Portland Hospital Gives Acutely Ill A 
Homecare Option” 
April 19, 2006, Wall St. Journal, by 
Gautam Naik. 
The VA hospital often operates at full capacity. It started this 
home hospital option in 2001 and has treated hundreds of patients 
in the comfort of their own homes. Time to get well seems to be 
shorter than actual hospital stays. Savings for the hospital for 
home patients is approximately one-third that of in-hospital 
patients. The patient is sent home with the necessary portable 
medical equipment, a physician is on 24-hr standby and nurses 
visit the home. Doctors will visit if necessary.  
Citigroup  
 
Nations Bank 
“WAMU Commitment Whams Citigroup 
and Nations Bank” 
May 22, 1998, CRC Press Release. 
 
A press release from the California Reinvestment Committee 
slamming Citigroup and NationsBank for their perceived lack of 
investment in low income areas and minority businesses. 
Bank One “The Jamie Dimon Show” 
July 22, 2002, Fortune, by Shawn Tully. 
Bank One CEO Jamie Dimon divested 33% of its loan portfolio 
due to a lack of customer profitability, redirected his resources and 
saved an estimated $1 billion. “If customers were merely 
borrowing money and had no other business with the bank, then 
Bank One was losing money on the relationship.” 
GE Capital 
 
 
 
 
 
Fidelity 
 
 
 
 
Capital One 
 
Charles Schwab 
 
“Why Service Stinks” 
October 23, 2000, Business Week, by 
Diane Brady. 
“GE Capital decided to charge $25 a year to GE Rewards 
MasterCard holders who didn’t rack up at least that much in 
annual interest charges. The message was clear: Those who pay 
their bills in full each month don’t boost the bottom line. GE has 
since sold its credit card unit to FirstUSA.”  
 
Another example, “Fidelity contacted 25,000 high cost serial 
callers and told them that they must use the web or automated 
calls for simple account and price information. Each customer was 
routed to a special representative who would teach callers how to 
use it.  
 
Using its expertise in tiering Capital One matches customers with 
products. 
Insurance 
Companies 
“Homeowners Face Rising Insurance 
Rates” 
March 23, 2006, Wall St. Journal, by 
M.P. McQueen. 
Insurers are dropping policies not only in hurricane zones but 
other parts of the country as well. Allstate plans to seek rate 
increases in 49 states to offset higher reinsurance costs. Other 
firms, such as Andover and Hingham Mutual are refusing to write 
policies on Cape Cod and beach areas. The state-run 
Massachusetts plan now has 30% of homeowners up from 2% 
only two years ago.  
Nationwide 
Insurance 
 
Allstate 
Insurance 
“Nationwide Dropping 35,000 policies” 
September 1, 2005, The Palm Beach 
Post, by David Sedore. 
“Nationwide Insurance Co. is dropping 35,000 homeowner 
policies in Florida, limiting the number of homes it insures 
statewide for fear of massive financial losses from future 
hurricanes.” Allstate will shed 95,000 policies. Citizens Property 
Insurance Corp, the state’s insurer of last resort and by law the 
most expensive, will end up insuring most of these homeowners. 
This is not based on socio-economic status as policies for many 
large beach homes will be dropped. 
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State Farm “State Farm files for Rate Increase” 
August 18, 2005, St. Petersburg Times, 
by Jeff Harrington. 
Filed with state regulators to increase homeowner policies by an 
average of 8.6% with some as much as 40%. “State Farm 
homeowners’ customers from other states are routinely dropped 
when they move to coastal Florida.” 
MetLife 
Insurance 
“Insurance Companies Dropping 
Customers, Raising Premiums” 
May 4, 2003, Minnesota Public Radio, 
by Bill Catlin. 
Minnesota law allows insurance companies to refuse to renew a 
policy under certain circumstances – customers who have two or 
more paid claims in three years. Storm-related claims don’t count. 
Neither does when an insurer collects from a third party. The Fair 
Plan state-run safety net program saw a 40% increase in 
homeowners’ applications in 2002. State Farm has tightened 
restrictions and increased premiums. 
Citizens 
Property  
 
Poe Financial 
“Strapped Insurers Flee Coastal Areas” 
April 26, 2006, USA Today, by Marilyn 
Adams. 
Florida’s state-run insurer of last resort has a record 815,000 
policies and $1.7B deficit. The CFO for the state of Florida urged 
a judge place Florida’s No. 3 home insurer, Poe Financial, into 
receivership because it lacks adequate reserves. 
 
Insurance 
Companies 
“Who Should Pay?” 
February 1, 2006, Wall St. Journal, by 
Liam Pleven. 
Takes a different look at the coastal insurance policy issue, posing 
two questions: (1) Who should pay for homeowners to live in 
dangerous places? (2) What role should states play in insuring 
those people’s property? The Florida state-run insurer of last resort 
now underwrites most of the state’s most vulnerable homes. 
Insurance 
Companies 
“State Prevents Insurers from Dropping 
Customers” 
August 20, 2004, Orlando Sentinel, by 
John Schmeltzer. 
After Hurricane Charley the state of Florida barred insurance 
companies from canceling policies for non-payment of premiums 
because residents could not reach damaged homes. 
Best Buy “The Customer is Always Right? Not 
Anymore” 
July 5, 2004, Associated Press, by 
Joshua Freed. 
Retailer Best Buy is tightening its rebate policies to combat 
customers who abuse policies. 
Hewlett-Packard “Middleware Netaction Products” 
July 15, 2002, HP Press Release. 
HP discontinued certain middleware products. It selected BEA 
Systems as a preferred partner for divested customers. HP offered 
customers incentives and preferential pricing to switch to BEA. 
Oxford Health 
Plans 
“Health Care Provider Dropping 26,000 
Medicare Customers” 
October 4, 1998, 
www.recordonline.com/1998/10/04/ 
oxfordhe.htm 
Oxford Health dropped 26,000 customers in four northeastern 
states. Three other insurers have recently tried to drop Medicare 
coverage for senior citizens in eastern Connecticut – Aetna 
worked out a deal with the state of Connecticut to let companies 
switch customers but they keep the Medicare. Oxford is also 
dropping 19,300 customers in New York. With more and more 
seniors joining the plan, HMOs can’t continue to offer the perks. 
Surgeons “Surgeon’s Weighty Dilemma” 
February 28, 2006, Wall St. Journal, by 
Gautam Naik. 
 
As demand for knee and hip replacements increase, some surgeons 
are turning away the overweight and obese. These patients likely 
need them the most but surgeons say obese people have a higher 
risk for medical complications, take longer to recover and often 
need repeat procedures. Some surgeons make patients lose weight 
first. The American Association of Hip and Knee Surgeons 
acknowledge that this is a growing trend. In late March 2006, the 
association will consider whether to issue special physician 
guidelines for the management of obese patients. At some 
National Health Services clinics in Britain, denial of obese 
patients has become policy. The demand seems to have created a 
capacity constraint where doctors can choose who gets an 
operation and who doesn’t. 
University of 
Texas Medical 
Branch 
“At One Hospital, A Stark Solution for 
Allocating Care,” 
September 23, 2003, Wall St. Journal, 
by Bernard Wysocki Jr. 
A large hospital in Texas has instituted strict guidelines whereby 
approximately 64,000 patients with unpaid medical bills are barred 
from making future appointments unless they require urgent care. 
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Dorothy Lane 
Markets 
“Dorothy Lane Loves its Customers” 
June 1999, Fast Company, by Scott 
Kirsner. 
Dorothy Lane Markets (DLM), a mid-western grocery store chain, 
moved to eliminate all but its most loyal customers from using its 
stores after it noted that they lost money on occasional customers. 
DLM stopped running newspaper ads. CEO Norman Mayne said, 
“Whenever we ran ads, offering a special on pork-and-beans, all 
we did was attract ‘cherry pickers’. It was a headache for us – and 
for our regular customers.” DLM communicates extensively with 
its most loyal customers and rewards them accordingly. 
NationsBank “Is Your Bank Trying to Dump You?” 
July 1997, Kiplinger’s Personal Finance 
Magazine, by Stephanie Gallagher and 
Nathaniel Kennedy. 
NationsBank rolled out a phone-call routing system that puts 
profitable customers at the head of the line for service. It also adds 
fees to credit card holders who avoid paying interest. Inactivity 
fees are also surfacing.  
Aramark 
Corporation 
“Aramark will not Bid to Renew Duke 
Contract” 
March 28, 2006, Duke Chronicle, by 
Rob Copeland. 
Aramark turned down an opportunity to rebid a contract it had 
with Duke University due to a lack of profits and unreasonable 
client requests. 
Greektown 
Casino 
“Greektown Bans 30 Winners” 
November 25, 2002, The Detroit News, 
by Becky Yerak. 
“Greektown banned thirty video poker players because their 
winnings, along with mounting cash-back incentives and freebies, 
made them unprofitable customers.” Players were told not to come 
back. “Our decision benefits 99.99 percent of our guests because it 
keeps high-paying machines in play and it does not force us to 
reduce the very generous comp, promotions and double-points 
programs that we offer,” said Roger Martin, Greektown 
spokesman. 
Filene’s 
Basement 
“Banned in Boston…and Anywhere Else 
That Has a Filene’s” 
July 14, 2003, Associated Press. 
Discount retailer Filene’s Basement banned two sisters from all of 
its stores for excessive returns. They each received a letter telling 
them that they were no longer welcome in the stores. The sisters 
acknowledge that “they have returned many items, occasionally 
complained about the service and had a few incidents with 
managers.” “Sales associates spent too much time handling the 
returns and complaints of the two sisters.” “There comes a point in 
time when you say enough is enough on both sides,” said James 
McGrady, CFO at Value City. 
Dodge & Cox “When Mutual Funds Don’t Want Your 
Cash”  
May 1, 2006, Wall St. Journal, by Diya 
Gullapalli. 
In response to large in-flows of cash due to strong historical 
performance, the firm had to stop accepting new institutional 
clients referred to them by industry consultants. 
Hospitals/ 
Healthcare 
Parent-Training Program Keeps the 
Doctor Away” 
April 27, 2004, Wall St. Journal, by 
Josee Rose. 
Medicaid could save billions of dollars annually if low-income 
parents are trained how to handle minor childhood ailments such 
as sore throats and runny noses. Four hundred parents in a Los 
Angeles area Head Start training program were educated on how 
to handle minor childhood ailments. This cut unnecessary trips to 
medical facilities by more than 100%, saving almost $50,000 and 
freeing up resources to handle more severe conditions. Potential 
dollar savings for large scale training programs could easily run 
into the tens of millions. If 12,000 families were trained, estimated 
savings is more than $2 million. 
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APPENDIX C: ESSAY 3, MANAGER INTERVIEWS 
 
Industry Company description Interviews 
Accounting services Three of the four largest global 
accounting firms and two major U.S. 
regional firms. All serve Fortune 
100 public as well as private firms. 
(3) Partner; (3) Senior Manager 
National human resource services 
provider 
$2B global business services 
provider 
(1) Regional Managing Director 
National cable services provider Fortune 500 communications 
products and services 
(1) Senior Executive 
Consulting services Global management consulting firm (1) Partner 
International rental car services Global provider of consumer 
services 
(1) Manager, North American 
Marketing 
Healthcare Leading U.S. provider of cancer 
treatment  
(1) Partner 
Investment advisory services Two of the leading investment 
advisory services firms in the U.S. 
(2) Senior Vice President, Vice 
President  
Information technology services Global provider of IT services to 
financial services firms  
(2) Chief Executive Officer, 
President 
Information technology products and 
services 
A Fortune 500 global leader in IT 
products and services; A growing 
regional IT provider 
(2) Senior client executive 
Legal Two of the leading U.S. law firms (2) Partner 
Manufacturing One of the world’s largest producers 
of equipment for the music industry 
(1) Manager, North American 
Marketing 
Marketing research Global provider of marketing 
research products and services 
(1) Partner 
Medical products and service Leading global provider of medical 
products and services 
(1) Senior Vice President 
Consumer Banking Major U.S. Bank in the northeast (1) Senior VP of marketing research 
Hospitality Restaurant and Bar (2) Owners 
Physician Practice/Healthcare Four large medical practices (6) Medical doctors 
Healthcare Major hospital chain in Northeast (1) Hospital administrator 
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APPENDIX D: ESSAY 3, EXPERIMENT STIMULI 
Divestment Warning.  Prior to divestment, participants read the following from Diversified bank: 
 
Warning: “We have recently reviewed your account.  We have determined that it is currently not 
beneficial for Diversified bank to continue to serve you as a customer because you do not maintain a high 
enough average account balance.  We strongly encourage you to increase your average account balance to 
$2,500 during the next six months.  It is easier for Diversified bank to meet your needs and is more 
beneficial to you when you maintain a $2,500 average account balance.  We will review your account 
again in six months.  Thank you for being a Diversified bank customer.” 
 
No Warning: “We have recently reviewed your account.  We have determined that it is currently 
beneficial for Diversified bank to continue to serve you as a customer because you maintain a high 
enough average account balance.  We strongly encourage you to increase your average account balance to 
$2,500 during the next six months.  It is easier for Diversified bank to meet your needs and is more 
beneficial to you when you maintain a $2,500 average account balance.  We will review your account 
again in six months.  Thank you for being a Diversified bank customer.” 
 
 
Reasons for Divestment.  The reason the company purports to have over the decision to terminate the 
customer relationship is manipulated by external and internal conditions using two scenarios:  
 
External explanation:  “Due to the persistent economic slowdown that is affecting Diversified bank, we 
can no longer serve as many customers as we have in the past without threatening the future existence of 
the bank.  As a result, we are forced to stop serving customers who do not maintain an average yearly 
minimum balance of $2,500 per year. Unfortunately, this means that we must sever our relationship with 
you as our customer.  Your account will be closed thirty days from the date of this letter.  Any remaining 
balance in your account after thirty days will be forwarded to you by bank check.” 
 
Internal explanation:  “Due to a change in the business strategy of Diversified bank, we can no longer 
serve as many customers as we have in the past without threatening the future existence of the bank.  As a 
result, we are forced to stop serving customers who do not maintain an average yearly minimum balance 
of $2,500 per year. Unfortunately, this means that we must sever our relationship with you as our 
customer.  Your account will be closed thirty days from the date of this letter.  Any remaining balance in 
your account after thirty days will be forwarded to you by bank check.” 
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